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ABSTRACT 
 
Two major trends in the American capital market affect whether firms adopt a long-term 
or a short-term orientation. The first trend is the growing concentration of ownership of public 
companies by index investors, such as Blackrock, Vanguard, and State Street, which are decade-
long stockholders. The second is the growing control of activist hedge funds on corporate boards, 
whose median holding period is known to be around 20 months. What do these trends mean for 
employee relations? This dissertation tests whether ownership by activist hedge funds, which have 
a relatively short-term investment time horizon, negatively affect employee satisfaction by 
reducing managerial attention to employees while increasing managerial attention to shareholders 
and stock market performances. This dissertation also tests whether a concentrated ownership by 
large index investors, which has a relatively long-term investment time horizon, positively affects 
employee satisfaction by increasing managerial attention to employees while reducing managerial 
attention to shareholders and stock market performances. I answer these questions by studying all 
publicly traded US companies from 2008 to early 2018, and by using big data – firms’ annual 
reports and anonymous employer reviews on Glassdor.com. More specifically, I developed new 
measures for firms’ attention to their human capital and its management practices by conducting 
text analysis of the risk factors section of the annual report where firms list their anticipated risks. 
Additionally, I analyze the relationship between employee satisfaction and firms’ financial 
performance.   
 xiii 
 
The results of my analyses show that ownership by most activist hedge funds and large 
index funds do not have a direct effect on employee satisfaction. However, ownership by Gamco 
Investors, one of the most active hedge funds in terms of the number of campaigns, reduces 
employee satisfaction. These findings suggest that activist hedge funds may have different 
strategies and goals, which affect employee satisfaction differently. These results also suggest that 
large index funds’ engagement with their portfolio firms on human capital issues is limited, leaving 
us with a question about the role of the powerful investors. This dissertation also found that 
shareholders affect managerial attention, such that ownership by activist hedge funds increased 
managerial attention to shareholders, and ownership by large index funds reduced managerial 
attention to firms’ stock market performance. Firms’ attention to employees was only reduced 
when firms were under Gamco Investors’ ownership. Additionally, ownership by activist hedge 
funds led managers to give less consideration to how employee issues can be associated with future 
cost. On the other hand, ownership by large index funds led managers to be less concerned about 
their employees as important resources for the firms. Finally, the results show that employee 
satisfaction is not the cause of firms’ financial performance, but rather the consequence of high 
firm performance.  
This dissertation contributes to the corporate governance and human capital management 
literature by examining labor implications of currents trends in shareholder ownership. Also, it 
makes a practical contribution to organizational researchers, investors, policy makers, and 
employees who need standardized measures for firms’ attention to human capital and human 
capital management practices and performances.  
Keywords: corporate governance, activist hedge funds, index funds, human capital management,  
       managerial attention, risk factors, employee satisfaction 
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CHAPTER Ⅰ 
 
Introduction 
 
  
Both financial and human capital are critical to the success of a firm. However, there is an 
imbalance between how much information we know about firms’ financial capital and their human 
capital. While we know a lot about firms’ financial data, especially if firms are publicly traded 
companies, we know little about firms’ human capital. For example, we can easily find in 
companies’ income statements their financial performance over a specific accounting period, such 
as revenue and expenses. Also, a firm’s financial state, including assets and liabilities, is described 
in their balance sheet in a detailed manner. In addition to these mandatory filings, firms’ real time 
stock price, which is known to reflect their market value, is publicly available in the stock market. 
Furthermore, firms’ investment relations departments frequently communicate with their financial 
communities to disseminate key information on the companies’ affairs that can affect their 
financial value. Yet, we do not know much about the basic information related to firms’ human 
capital, such as workforce composition, skills and training, compensation, safety, turnover, and 
employee satisfaction. It is even harder to understand the more intangible factors that affect 
employees such as corporate culture and values.  
One main reason why there is an imbalance between how much we know about firms’ 
financial capital and their human capital is because firms are not required to report their human 
capital management practices and performances. The only information that is mandated for public 
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firms to disclose in their annual report related to their human capital is the total number of 
employees and the ratio of the CEO’s pay to that of the median-paid employee. Lack of data on 
human capital poses challenges not only to researchers studying labor issues in management but 
also to investors, policy makers, and employees themselves. It leads to the following practical 
question: “How can we better understand firms’ human capital and its management when we lack 
available data?” 
I take on this question by designing and validating new measures for firms’ attention to 
human capital and its management practices using big data. More specifically, I use the risk factors 
section of firms’ annual report, where firms list their anticipated risks, to develop the following set 
of variables: firms’ attention to human capital, firms’ attention to each human capital management 
practice (i.e. recruitment, turnover, benefits, etc.), and firms association of their employees with a 
resource versus a cost. I also measure employee satisfaction using anonymous employer review 
data on the website, Glassdoor.com.  
The new measures are used to answer the following theoretical question: What is the labor 
implication of the growing ownership and control by activist hedge funds and large index funds, 
the two notable trends in the US financial market? I empirically test whether and how ownership 
by activist hedge funds and large index funds affects employee satisfaction through influencing 
firms’ attention to human capital. More specifically, I examine whether ownership by activist 
hedge funds negatively affects employee satisfaction by reducing firms’ attention to employees. 
Also, I analyze whether ownership by large index funds positively affects employee satisfaction 
by increasing firms’ attention to employees.  Additionally, I test the relationship between employee 
satisfaction and firms’ financial performance.  
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My dissertation contributes to the two following areas. First, my dissertation contributes to 
corporate governance and human capital management research by studying the labor consequences 
of current trends of shareholder ownership. Previous research has focused on analyzing how 
shareholders’ ownership and engagement affect shareholder value of the target firms. My 
dissertation shows that shareholders’ ownership also affects managerial attention to firms’ human 
capital and its management practices.   
Second, my dissertation makes a practical contribution to researchers, investors, policy 
makers, and employees who need more information on firms’ human capital. For example, large 
institutional investors may want to integrate human capital-related risks into their investment 
decisions. Other groups of investors have also called for standardized reporting guidelines on 
human capital management for publicly traded companies. I created an unobtrusive standardized 
measure for firms’ attention to human capital-related risks using big data that can be used widely 
among organizational scholars and various stakeholders. It is my hope that these new measures 
can meet the increasing demand from institutional investors and the public calling for more 
transparent information on firms’ human capital. 
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CHAPTER Ⅱ 
 
 Context – Changing Financial Capital Markets and  
Corporate Ownership Since the Financial Crisis 
 
There are two big trends in the US capital market: the growing concentration of ownership 
by passive index funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs), and the rise of hedge fund activism. 
The first trend in the US capital market is a growing concentration of ownership by passive index 
funds and ETFs. The leading institutional investors in the passive index fund and ETF industry are 
Blackrock, Vanguard, and State Street, which together constitute the largest shareholder in 88 
percent of the S&P 500 firms (Fichtner, Heemskerk, & Garcia-Bernardo, 2017). Blackrock’s assets 
under management increased from $3.346 trillion in 2009 to $6.288 trillion in 2017, of which 50% 
were invested in index funds and ETFs in 2009 and 66% in 2017 (Blackrock, 2018). According to 
the data I collected, the three companies’ collective ownership of S&P 500 companies grew from 
8.4% in 2008 to 19.9% in 2017. In other words, in the current capital market in the US, three large 
institutional investors own on average one-fifth of shares of all S&P 500 companies.  
Second, American corporations are under greater threat of activist hedge funds. According 
to FactSet, a financial research firm, the number of high impact campaigns by activist shareholders 
increased from 238 in 2011 to 364 in 2019. Hedge fund activists’ reach is growing wider as well. 
Although hedge funds have traditionally targeted small-cap companies, they also began to target 
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larger companies beginning around 2013. The median market cap of target companies increased 
from $55 million in 2009 to $283 million in 2015, and between 2009 and 2015, 15% of S&P 500 
companies faced activist campaigns. For example, large companies such as Apple, GE, and 
Qualcomm were targeted by Carl Icahn, Trian Fund Management, and JANA Partners, 
respectively. Activist hedge funds aim to change the way a company is managed to maximize the 
company’s performance and shareholder value. In this chapter, I analyze each trend in depth and 
discuss potential implications.  
 
Increasing Concentration of Ownership by Index Funds 
 
Ownership in American corporations has traditionally been dispersed. Berle and Means 
described in their seminal book published in 1932, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, that the share ownership of American corporations in the 20th century was greatly 
dispersed among thousands of shareholders. The reason is as follows: as the US economy 
underwent a rapid growth during the 19th and the early 20th centuries, American corporations 
grew enormously in size. The growing need of capital by large American corporations was met 
by investors around the country, resulting in a dispersed stock ownership.  
The typical shareholder of large American corporations did not have the knowledge, 
experience, and commitment to be involved in the day-to-day activities of the firms. As a result, 
salaried managers who have little share ownership managed the firms' activities without effective 
shareholder control. "Managerialism" arose as ownership was separated from control, and as 
managers became more influential than shareholders in managing the companies. 
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Dispersed ownership is a central problem in the study of corporate governance. By the 
1970s, law and economics scholars started to question the widely accepted theory of 
managerialism. How could a diffused share ownership become so prevalent in modern 
corporations if it leads to mismanagement? Defining public corporations as the nexus-of-
contracts among individuals, Jensen and Meckling (1976) focused on the problem that agency 
cost is inherent in the relationship between shareholders and managers. However, they suggested 
that a capital market and a market for managers incentivize managers to orient toward 
shareholder value and to reduce agency cost. Fama and Jensen (1983) also explained that the 
agency problems resulting from separation of decision management from risk-bearing functions 
could be controlled by separating the management (initiation and implementation) and control 
(ratification and monitoring) of decisions. 
Yet, sociologists and organizational theorists criticized the contractarian and functionalist 
view of the corporations held by law and economics scholars (Granovetter, 1985). Critics 
pointed out the problem that the contractarian approach failed to consider social structure and 
politics in the functioning of the governance systems. Also, critics argued that the functionalist 
approach - explaining corporations and surrounding institutions by their function of promoting 
stock market value - neglected the dynamics and diversity of governance institutions. 
Sociologists and organizational theorists responded to the limitation of the contractarian and 
functionalist approach by providing alternative interpretations of corporate governance systems 
based on history, power, and culture (Fligstein, 1990; Roy, 1997; Davis, 2005).   
Ownership has become more concentrated in the hands of index funds since 2008. 
Beginning from the early 1980s, American households increased their participation in the equity 
market by purchasing shares in mutual funds for their personal pension plans. As a result, a 
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handful of popular mutual funds, such as Fidelity, have become the most significant corporate 
owners, holding almost 30% of US corporate ownership as a group in mid 2000s (Davis, 2008). 
While these mutual funds had the potential power to influence corporate governance of their 
invested firms, they were reluctant to engage with their invested firms partly due to conflicts of 
interest. Yet, research shows that mutual funds tend to vote with management when they have 
business ties with the firms (Davis and Kim, 2007). Another possible reason that mutual funds 
remained passive in general was because they rarely maintained their ownership block for more 
than 5 years, routinely liquidating their large holdings. In sum, mutual funds in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s passively controlled their invested firms, and were actively managed. 
Since 2008, a massive shift has occurred from expensive, actively managed mutual funds 
towards cheap, passively managed index mutual funds and exchange traded funds (ETFs). 
Consequently, Blackrock, Vanguard, and State Street - the three biggest index fund managers in 
the US - collectively constitute the largest shareholder in at least 40 percent of all US public 
companies and 88 percent of the S&P 500 companies (Fichtner, Heemskerk, and Garcia-
Bernardo, 2017). 
Largely due to the inexpensive nature of passive index funds, their returns are higher than 
the returns of most actively managed funds. Therefore, it was not by chance that passive index 
funds attracted institutional and retail investors around the country during the past decade. In 
2007, Warren Buffett, a renowned investor and a chairman of Berkshire Hathaway, betted 
against Protege Partners that an index fund would outperform a basket of actively managed 
hedge funds in the following decade. After 10 years, Buffet's prediction turned out to be correct 
as his S&P500 index fund returned 7.1% compounded annually, while a basket of hedge funds 
selected by Protege Partners returned an average of 2.2%.  
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ETFs are securities that are created to behave the same way as a specific index or a 
collection of different securities. ETFs became popular investment tools as they combine 
desirable traits of index funds and stocks. Like index funds, ETFs are low-cost, diversified, and 
mostly passively managed. Like stocks, ETFs are traded on stock exchanges whenever the 
market is open through broker-dealers. The largest ETF by AUM is SPDR S&P 500 from State 
Street, which is also the oldest ETF that tracks the S&P 500. The second largest ETF is iShares 
Core S&P 500 from Blackrock, and the third largest ETF is the Vanguard Total Stock Market 
ETF that tracks the entire U.S. stock market. In addition to tracking a specific index, ETFs can 
also be created by combining a set of stocks in a specific sector or a country. 
I explain below a brief history of the three largest index funds in the U.S - Blackrock, 
Vanguard, and State Street. 
 
BlackRock, Inc. 
Blackrock was founded in 1988 as an institutional asset manager by Laurence Fink and 
his former colleagues from First Boston investment bank. Laurence Fink and his team started 
their business under the umbrella of The Blackstone Group as The Blackstone Group offered a 
$5 million credit line to launch a joint venture. However, due to a disagreement regarding 
methods of compensation, Laurence Fink and his team branched out on their own in 1994, 
naming their asset management operation Blackrock.  
After going public on the New York Stock Exchange in 1999, Blackrock broadened their 
platform in the asset management industry partly through M&As. Blackrock acquired State 
Street Research & Management's holding company in 2005, including its mutual fund business. 
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In 2009, Blackrock acquired Barclays Global Investors (BGI) which included its exchange-
traded-fund (ETF) business called iShares. Since Blackrock's acquisition of BGI, iShares asset 
under management (AUM) increased from $385 billion to $2.2 trillion, now comprising 30% of 
Blackrock's AUM. In addition to ETF business, Blackrock also grew its index investment 
business. Its non-ETF index investment now comprises of 36% of its AUM, while its active 
investment comprises of 26%. In 2019, Blackrock's revenue reached $14.5 billion, leaving $4.5 
billion of net income. At the end of 2019, Blackrock had $7.4 trillion of assets under 
management. Due to the coronavirus pandemic, Blackrock’s assets under management fell to 
$6.5 trillion AUM on March 31st, 2020.  
 
The Vanguard Group, Inc. 
Vanguard, the largest mutual fund company, was founded in 1974 by John Bogle. John 
Bogle was a pioneer investor who saw an opportunity in low-cost index funds. He knew from his 
earlier years that tracking the benchmark index could be more profitable than investing in 
actively managed funds that charged a high management fee. In 1976, he created the first mutual 
index fund that tracked the performance of S&P 500, and made it available to the general public. 
Although the first index fund was not well received by the public at first, John Bogle persisted 
with his original model, growing the fund to be one of the largest in the world today (now called 
the Vanguard 500 Index Fund). After offering the second mutual fund in 1986, Vanguard 
successfully launched a series of other index funds, including a total stock market index fund and 
a small cap index fund. One of the reasons why Vanguard could keep their expense ratio low 
(0.10%), less than one-fifth that of the industry average (0.58%), is because it is a mutual fund 
company that is owned by its fund investors. Because Vanguard does not have outside owners 
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like many other investment management companies, it can return profits to their fund investors 
in the form of low expenses. As of 2019, Vanguard has $5.6 trillion in assets under management, 
and operates about 190 funds in the U.S. and 220 funds abroad.  
State Street Corporation 
State Street's predecessor, Union Bank, was founded in 1792. Union Bank later became 
the National Union Bank of Boston, and in 1925, it merged with State Street Deposit & Trust 
which was established in 1891. The State Street name survived, but because the merged bank 
operated under National Union's charter, it is regarded as the second oldest US bank in 
continuous operation.    
State Street created the first ETF in 1993. In late 1980s, when American Stock Exchange 
(Amex) had been losing behind the NYSE and Nasdaq, Nathan Most, the VP of Amex new 
product development, and his colleague Steven Bloom came up with a new product idea that 
later became the first ETF. At first, Most and Bloom approached Vanguard to establish a 
partnership. However, John Bogle disliked the idea of frequent trading as he was afraid that it 
would drive up the cost. Most and Bloom then approached State Street, and in 1993, the team 
finally launched the first ETF, called SPDR S&P 500 (Standard & Poor's Depositary Receipts), 
that tracked S&P 500 index. SPDR S&P 500 was first traded on Amex, but since NYSE 
Euronext acquired Amex in 2008, it has been listed on NYSE Arca. In 2019, State Street's 
revenue reached $11.8 billion, leading to $2.2 billion of net income. As of 2019, State Street has 
$3.1 trillion in assets under management.  
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Then, how much did the collective ownership by Blackrock, Vanguard, and State Street 
grow since the financial crisis? Patterns in the data show that for S&P500 companies, the 
average collective ownership by Big Three index funds more than doubled from 8.4% in 2008 to 
19.9% in 2017. As can be seen in Figure Ⅱ.1, ownership is increasingly concentrated in the 
hands of three largest index funds.   
 
Figure Ⅱ.1. Average collective ownership by Blackrock, Vanguard, and State Street 
(using 13F data from Thomson Reuters) 
 
 
Similarly, for S&P1500 companies – 1,500 companies in the S&P 500 large cap, S&P 
400 mid cap, and S&P 600 small cap indices – the average collective ownership by Big Three 
index funds tripled from 7.1% in 2008 to 21.3% in 2017. Figure Ⅱ.2. reveals that the level of 
ownership by the Big Three has been similarly increasing across S&P 500, S&P 400, and S&P 
 12 
 
600 categories. However, for firms that fall outside of the S&P1500 index, the Big Three’s 
collective ownership increased from 3.6% in 2008 to 9.0% in 2017, reflecting the fact that the 
increasing concentration of ownership is mainly caused by the growth of index funds.   
Figure Ⅱ.2. Average collective ownership by Big3 index funds for firms in each S&P category 
(using 13F data from Thomson Reuters) 
 
Increasing concentration can have broad consequences. Some researchers predict that 
large block holders will have a power and a vested interest in improving firms' governance 
structures and performance. Because of the nature of index funds, they lack the discretion to buy 
and sell, and thus their only option is to exercise voice. Also, so long as firms remain in an index, 
leading index funds are guaranteed to be their long-term block holders. In this line of prediction, 
research found that passive index funds use their large voting blocs to influence firms to appoint 
more independent directors and remove takeover defenses and dual-class share structure (Appel, 
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Gormley, and Keim, 2016). In addition to voting, institutional investors engage with managers 
and boards behind-the-scenes to improve corporate governance. Research reveals that long-term 
investors intervene more intensely than short-term investors (McCahery, Sautner, and Starks, 
2016).  
On the other hand, some researchers argue that concentrated ownership without active 
engagement will rather weaken the governance structure, leading to managerial entrenchment. 
Because large index funds cover thousands of stocks and their value comes from their low-cost 
model, index funds will find active monitoring costly. In this line of prediction, research shows 
that passive index fund ownership increases the likelihood that the CEO becomes president or 
chairman and reduces the fraction of newly appointed independent board members (Schmidt and 
Fahlenbrach, 2017).     
Another consequence of increased concentration of ownership by a handful of index 
funds is an increase in common ownership. Some researchers argue that common ownership will 
reduce firms' incentive to compete, leading to reduced product market competition. Research 
shows that common ownership of airline companies resulted in 3-7% higher airline ticket prices, 
generating hidden social cost (Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu, 2018). In sum, increasing concentration 
of ownership by Big3 index funds have broad consequences, and several studies show mixed 
findings. 
Then, what are the principles that drive index funds’ proxy voting decisions? As can be 
seen below in the summary of the proxy voting guidelines for Blackrock, Vanguard, and State 
Street, Big3 index funds encourage - and sometimes require - companies to ensure board 
accountability and promote long-term growth. 
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Blackrock’s proxy voting guidelines 
Blackrock states that its primary concern is the best long-term economic interest of 
shareholders. In order to protect and enhance shareholders' long-term economic interest, 
Blackrock exercises its voting rights based on the following guidelines.  
First, regarding board composition, Blackrock expects most of the board of directors of 
their invested firms to be independent so that boards can act in the best interest of the companies. 
Blackrock specifically requires that all members of key committees - audit, compensation, and 
nominating/governance committees - should be independent. In addition, in order to ensure that 
the directors exercise appropriate oversight of management, Blackrock discourages directors 
from sitting on the board of more than four companies (or, two companies if he/she serves as a 
CEO of the company under review). Blackrock may vote against directors when a board amends 
the charter, articles, or bylaws such that the effect may be to significantly reduce shareholder 
rights (e.g. implementing or renewing a poison pill without shareholder approval). Blackrock 
asks boards for regular performance reviews and skills assessments and expects the boards to be 
comprised of diverse individuals based on multiple dimensions such as gender, ethnicity, race, 
age, experience, geographic location, skills, and perspective in the nomination process. 
Regarding gender diversity, Blackrock encourages boards to have at least two female directors.  
Second, Blackrock has the following voting guidelines regarding governance structures. 
While Blackrock typically supports the annual election of the boards, it allows for exceptions 
when boards provide an appropriate strategic rationale for a classified board structure. Blackrock 
believes that a majority vote standard - requiring directors to be elected by a majority of the 
shares voted - ensures director accountability, and thus generally opposes cumulative voting. 
Blackrock defers to boards to choose the most appropriate leadership structure. However, when 
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companies choose a combined chair / CEO model, Blackrock encourages the board to designate 
a lead independent director who has the power to provide formal input into board meeting 
agendas, and to call and preside at meetings of the independent directors. While Blackrock 
believes that every common stock should have equal voting rights, it allows for multi-class share 
structures if companies receive shareholder approval on a periodic basis. In general, Blackrock 
supports standardized proxy access proposals that allow a shareholder who held three percent of 
a company's shares for at least three years the right to nominate the greater of up to two directors 
or 20% of the board.   
Third, Blackrock believes that compensation committees are in the best position to 
determine the appropriate compensation plans. While Blackrock defers to compensation 
committees to make compensation decisions, it requires the compensation committee to clearly 
demonstrate how the compensation plans reflect corporate strategy and how they incentivize 
long-term shareholder value creation.   
 
Vanguard’s proxy voting guidelines 
What are Vanguard's proxy voting guidelines? First, regarding board composition, 
Vanguard requires a majority of the boards to be independent. If this is not the case, it may vote 
against the nominating committee and all non-independent board members. If the board 
continues to be majority non-independent in the second year, Vanguard may vote against the 
entire board. Vanguard specifically requires all directors in the following key committees - audit, 
compensation, and nominating and governance committee - to be independent. In order to ensure 
that each director can fulfill his/her responsibility at each company, Vanguard limits the 
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maximum number of directorship positions each director can serve to four boards (or, two boards 
if he/she is a named executive officer of the company under review).  
Second, Vanguard generally supports the following governance structures to ensure 
accountability of the board and management. In general, Vanguard promotes declassified board 
structure, a majority voting for election of directors, equal voting rights, and proxy access. 
Vanguard generally votes against the adoption of poison pills.  
Third, Vanguard votes case-by-case on executive compensation proposals because it 
understands that norms and expectations can vary by company size, age, location, and industry. 
Yet, in order to ensure that compensation plans are linked to long-term shareholder value, 
Vanguard specifically states that the following factors are to be considered as red flags - the 
long-term plan making up less than 50% of total pay or having a performance period of less than 
three years. 
 
State Street’s proxy voting guidelines 
What are the principles that drive State Street's proxy voting decisions? First, regarding 
board composition, State Street believes that a sufficiently independent board will effectively 
perform oversight functions to protect shareholder value. State Street specifically requires 
directors of key committees - compensation, audit, nomination, and other committees that are 
required to be fully independent by local market standards - should be independent. When 
companies demonstrate negative governance practices, State Street will apply stricter standards 
for director independence. In order to ensure board commitment at each company, State Street 
may withhold votes from director nominees who sit on more than six public company boards, or 
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CEOs of a public company who sit on more than three public company boards. State Street 
expects boards of Russell 3000 to have at least one female board member. 
Second, in terms of governance structures, State Street generally supports annual 
elections for the board of directors, majority vote standard, and equal voting rights. State Street 
generally votes against the adoption or renewal of poison pills, and supports mandates requiring 
shareholder approval of a poison pill. While State Street believes that proxy access is a 
fundamental right for long-term shareholders, it reviews proxy access proposals on a case-by-
case basis to provide management the flexibility to design the system. Similarly, State Street 
analyzes proposals for the separation of chair/CEO on a case-by-case basis to take into account 
the role of a lead director and the overall governance structure as well as the performance of the 
company. 
Third, State Street supports proposals on executive compensation that have a strong 
relationship between executive pay and company performance over a five-year period. State 
Street expects companies to disclose information on absolute and relative pay levels, peer 
selection, the mix of long-term and short-term incentives, and how executive pay structures are 
aligned with shareholder interest and company strategy and performance. 
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Increasing Threat of Activist Hedge Funds 
At the same time, activist hedge funds have become more prevalent. Hedge fund industry 
has experienced an explosive growth in the past 25 years. From early 1990s to 2003, the number 
of hedge funds in the US increased from approximately 400 to 6,000 (Staff Report to the US 
SEC, 2003). During the same period, hedge funds' assets under management grew from $50 
billion to $600 billion. As of 2019, there are over 9,000 hedge funds in the US with more than 
$3.1 trillion AUM.  
Hedge fund activism is a relatively recent phenomenon that became prevalent after 2000 
(Brav, Jiang, and Kim, 2015). During the early 1990s, less than 50 activisms were initiated 
annually based on the number of Schedule 13D filings. In 2011, 238 high impact campaigns 
were announced against US companies, and the number reached 364 in 2019 (FactSet 
SharkWatch). Figure Ⅱ.3 shows the number of high impact campaigns in the US from 2011 to 
2019. High impact campaigns are defined as campaigns involving market moving objectives: 
board control, board representation, maximization of shareholder value, public short 
position/bear raid, removal of director(s), no dissident nominee to fill vacancy, removal of 
officer(s).  
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Figure Ⅱ.3. Number of high impact campaigns from 2011 to 2019 
(from FactSet SharkWatch) 
 
 
Hedge funds and their activism campaigns not only grew in number, but they have also 
become more successful in obtaining board seats. In 2011, out of 131 campaigns that sought 
board seats, 54 campaigns obtained a seat, leading to on average 0.41 board seats per campaign. 
In 2019, 161 campaigns sought board seats, and 98 campaigns received a seat, leading to on 
average 0.61 board seats per campaign (FactSet SharkWatch). Figure Ⅱ.4 shows the success rate 
of high impact campaigns in the US in obtaining board seats from 2011 to 2019. 
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Figure Ⅱ.4. Success rate of high impact campaigns in the US in obtaining board seats 
(from FactSet SharkWatch) 
 
 
How does hedge fund activism affect target firms? Research shows that hedge fund 
activism promotes shareholder value and firm performance. Empirical studies found 
approximately 7% abnormal return around the announcement of activism (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, 
and Thomas, 2008) and improvement in a firm's production and innovation efficiency over the 
five-year period following hedge fund intervention (Brav, Jiang, and Kim 2015; Brav, Jiang, Ma, 
and Tian, 2018). 
Yet, employees of target firms do not share the benefits of the improvements associated 
with hedge fund activism (Brav, Jiang, and Kim, 2015). Rather, hedge fund activism facilitates 
transfer of labor rents to shareholders, thus negatively affecting workers' welfare. An empirical 
study found that activist intervention leads to 7.3% reduction in productivity-adjusted per-hour 
wages for employees of target companies (Brav, Jiang, and Kim, 2015).  
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Schedule 13D, commonly referred to as a beneficial ownership report, is used to create 
activist hedge funds’ ownership measures. Any individual or group of persons that acquires more 
than 5% of a voting class of a company’s equity securities with the intent of influencing control of 
the issuer is required to file Schedule 13D with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) within 10 days after the purchase. Schedule 13D allows the investing public to understand 
who the largest shareholders of a company are and the purpose of their transactions. However, 
institutional investors are eligible to file abbreviated Schedule 13G if they have not acquired the 
securities with an intent of influencing control of the issuer. Similarly, individuals who are not 
institutional investors can also file Schedule 13G if they have not acquired the securities with an 
intent of influencing the issuer and are not beneficial owner of 20% or more of the security. 
I explain below how I created activist hedge funds’ ownership measures using Schedule 
13D. First, I downloaded SEC’s index files for all quarters from 2008 to 2018 from the SEC 
website1. SEC’s index files provide information on form type, company name, CIK, date of filing, 
and web address for every filing submitted to SEC. Then, using form type, I read in index files for 
Schedule 13Ds to pandas DataFrame in Python. In total, 131,853 13D or 13D/A documents were 
filed with SEC between 2008 and 2018.  
Second, using Requests and Beautiful Soup modules and web addresses in the index files, 
I fetched the names and CIKs of filers and issuers for every 13D filing. It is important to note 
that not all company names in the index files are names of the filers – approximately half of the 
company names in the index files are names of the issuers. For this reason, I fetched the names 
and CIK of filers and issuers from the original 13D filings instead of relying on company 
 
1 www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/full-index/ 
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information on index files. Then, when issuers’ CIK was in my sample, I fetched information on 
ownership (%), purpose of transaction, and filing date from the original 13D filings. The second 
step resulted in 26,549 13D and 13D/A filings. 
Third, I coded 1 if the filer of 13D was one of 100 activist shareholders identified by 
Thomson Reuters Corporate Governance database and 0 otherwise. Table Ⅱ.1 shows the names 
of 100 activist shareholders selected by Thomson Reuters. For robustness check, I used FactSet 
SharkWatch 50 key activists list to identify activist hedge funds. Table Ⅱ.2 lists the names of 50 
key activists selected by FactSet SharkWatch. Table Ⅱ.2 from FactSet SharkWatch also shows 
activists’ equity assets, assets under management, total number of campaigns initiated by each 
activist until the end of 2019, and the number of high impact campaigns. 
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Table Ⅱ.1. List of 100 activist shareholders (from Thomson Reuters database) 
  Name   Name 
1 Accipiter Capital Management LLC  51 Loeb Partners Corporation  
2 Arcadia Capital Management  52 Luminus Management LLC  
3 Atticus Capital LP  53 Marathon Partners  
4 Barington Capital Group LP  54 Millennium Management LLC  
5 Biglari Capital Corporation  55 MMI Investments LP  
6 Biotechnology Value Fund LP  56 Nanes Balkany Partners LLC  
7 BlueLine Partners LLC  57 New Mountain Vantage LP  
8 Breeden Capital Management LLC  58 Newcastle Partners LP  
9 Brencourt Advisors LLC  59 Obrem Capital Management LLC  
10 Bulldog Investors General Partnership  60 Oliver Press Partners LLC  
11 Cannell Capital Management LLC  61 Opportunity Partners LP  
12 Carlson Capital LP  62 Osmium Partners LLC  
13 Catalyst Fund Managers Pty Ltd  63 Palo Alto Investors LLC  
14 Caxton Associates LP  64 Pardus Capital Management LP  
15 Centennial Energy Partners LP  65 Paulson & Co Inc  
16 Chapman Capital LLC  66 Perry Capital LLC  
17 Clinton Group Inc  67 Pershing Square Capital Management  
18 Costa Brava Partners  68 Pirate Capital LLC  
19 Cowen Group Inc  69 PL Capital LLC  
20 Crescendo Partners II LP  70 Q Investments LP  
21 D E Shaw & Co LP  71 Quercus Trust  
22 DellaCamera Capital Management LLC  72 Raging Capital Management LLC  
23 Dialectic Capital Management LLC  73 Red Oak Capital Partners LLC  
24 Discovery Group I LLC  74 Relational Investors LLC  
25 Dolphin Limited Partnership III LP  75 Richard M. Osborne Trust  
26 Eastbourne Capital Management LLC  76 Riley Investment Management LLC  
27 Elliott International Capital Advisors  77 SAC Capital Advisors LP  
28 Eminence Capital LLC  78 Sandell Asset Management Corp  
29 Farallon Capital Management LLC  79 Santa Monica Partners LP  
30 Financial Edge Fund LP  80 Shamrock Capital Advisors Inc  
31 Firebrand Financial Group Inc  81 Soros Fund Management LLC  
32 GAMCO Investors Inc  82 Southeastern Asset Management Inc  
33 Greenlight Capital Inc  83 Spencer Capital Management LLC  
34 Harbert Management Corporation  84 Steel Partners LLC  
35 Harbinger Capital Partners  85 Sterling Capital Management LLC  
36 Henry Investment Trust LP  86 Stilwell Value LLC  
37 Highfields Capital Management LP  87 Strome Investment Management LP  
38 Highland Capital Management LP  88 Susan L Ciciora Trust  
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Table Ⅱ.2. List of 50 key activists (from FactSet SharkWatch database) 
 Name 
Equity 
Assets 
($mil) 
AUM 
($mil) 
Total 
Campaign 
High 
Impact 
1 TCI Fund Management Ltd. 23774.96 0 27 15 
2 Icahn Associates Holding LLC 19209.98 0 156 105 
3 GAMCO Asset Management, Inc. 10208.55 12973 620 74 
4 Elliott Management Corp. 9966.1 67863 188 123 
5 ValueAct Capital Management LP 9464.93 13948 115 53 
6 Trian Fund Management LP 8294.98 9822 29 28 
7 Cevian Capital AB 8181.22 0 17 14 
8 Third Point LLC 7647.91 19279 70 46 
9 Southeastern Asset Management, Inc. 6141.22 14063 34 23 
10 Pershing Square Capital Management LP 5603.28 9629 61 34 
11 Carlson Capital LP 4293.47 15990 30 13 
12 
City of London Investment Management 
Co. Ltd. 3580.22 5203 42 33 
13 Starboard Value LP 3250.48 5549 167 126 
14 Karpus Management, Inc. 2803.32 3443 134 68 
15 Ancora Advisors LLC 1323.48 4612 49 32 
16 Basswood Capital Management LLC 894.3 2640 12 10 
17 Greenlight Capital, Inc. 868.33 1857 42 26 
18 Engaged Capital LLC 794.35 0 32 29 
19 JANA Partners LLC 785.77 3565 69 52 
20 Corvex Management LP 758 2417 24 22 
21 Sarissa Capital Management LP 698.15 0 15 9 
22 Mangrove Partners 466.08 2101 14 11 
39 Icahn Associates Corporation  89 Tang Capital Management LLC  
40 JANA Partners LLC  90 Tennenbaum Capital Partners LLC  
41 Jewelcor Management Inc  91 Third Point LLC  
42 K Capital Partners LLC  92 Toscafund Asset Management LLP  
43 Kanders & Co Inc  93 Trian Fund Management LP  
44 Karpus Investment Management  94 Trilogy Inc  
45 Kingstown Capital Partners LLC  95 Trinad Advisors LLC  
46 Lawndale Capital Management LLC  96 ValueAct Capital Partners LP  
47 Laxey Partners Limited  97 Wattles Capital Management LLC  
48 Lenox Wealth Management Inc  98 Western Investment LLC  
49 Liberation Investment Group LLC  99 Wintergreen Advisers LLC  
50 Locksmith Capital Management LLC  100 Wynnefield Capital Inc  
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23 
Land & Buildings Investment 
Management LLC 423.17 577 31 28 
24 Raging Capital Management LLC 366.02 1221 37 26 
25 Biglari Capital LLC 345.43 1009 21 16 
26 Oasis Management (Hong Kong) LLC 311.54 0 25 21 
27 Sandell Asset Management Corp. 259.59 491 40 35 
28 Legion Partners Asset Management LLC 258 415 22 20 
29 Highland Capital Management LP 257.95 5467 25 16 
30 PL Capital Advisors LLC 227.73 393 55 42 
31 Cannell Capital LLC 213.54 492 54 41 
32 Steel Partners LLC 194.6 0 136 74 
33 Bulldog Investors LLC 192.29 398 226 171 
34 Engine Capital Management LP 175.71 0 29 29 
35 Wynnefield Capital, Inc. 126.29 233 99 60 
36 Crystal Amber Advisers (UK) LLP 121.6 0 11 10 
37 Voce Capital Management LLC 119 203 23 20 
38 VIEX Capital Advisors, LLC 117.08 0 31 24 
39 Stilwell Value LLC 83.43 206 90 84 
40 Veteri Place Corp. 67.77 207 53 46 
41 Northern Right Capital Management LP 65.98 196 30 21 
42 Fondren Management LP 54.69 217 22 18 
43 Osmium Partners LLC 53.99 0 15 10 
44 Red Mountain Capital Partners LLC 50.39 153 16 16 
45 Barington Companies Investors LLC 36.63 120 51 43 
46 Privet Fund Management LLC 33.15 211 27 17 
47 Clover Partners LP 24.83 87 16 15 
48 FrontFour Capital Group LLC 14.85 208 25 23 
49 Marcato Capital Management LP 2.04 625 26 24 
50 Clinton Group, Inc. 0 460 53 46 
 
Finally, I organized the data set by issuer-year, the unit of analysis. More specifically, 
when a shareholder filed multiple 13D(/A) in the same year for the same issuer, I kept the 
earliest filing data of the year to mark the beginning of the potential control by the filer. Also, 
when multiple shareholders, including an activist hedge fund, filed 13D(/A) for the same issuer 
on the same year, I kept data on the activist hedge fund as it has the highest potential to influence   
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the control of the issuer company. As a result, 8,420 issuer-year observations had at least one 
shareholder that owned more than 5% of their shares, and 1,532 issuer-year observations had an 
active hedge fund as their beneficial owner.  
Schedule 13D filings data show that the most active hedge fund measured by the number 
of 13D filing is Gamco Investors followed by Icahn Associates and ValueAct. Gamco Investors 
was an active shareholder for 595 observations, contributing to more than 1/3 of the 13D filed by 
100 activist hedge funds. The result is consistent with the analysis by the FactSet SharkWatch 
database that shows Gamco as the activist with the highest number of total campaigns. Table Ⅱ.3 
lists 10 most active hedge funds in order of frequency. When I used SharkWatch 50 key activist 
list, the results were similar. While SharkWatch does not include Discovery Group or Relational 
Investors in its list, it includes Starboard Value that ranks fourth and ties with Stilwell Value in 
order of frequency. Thomson Reuters and FactSet SharkWatch share eight out of the top ten 
activist hedge funds in their lists. 
 
Table Ⅱ.3. Top 10 activist hedge funds in order of frequency 
 
 
 
 Top Names  # of Observations 
1 Gamco Investors 595 
2 Icahn Associates 117 
3 VA Partners / ValueAct Capital 78 
4 Discovery Group 57 
5 Stilwell Value 45 
6 Elliott Associates 37 
7 Pershing Square Capital Management 37 
8 Trian Fund Management 34 
9 Relational Investors 30 
10 Clinton Group 29 
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Table Ⅱ.4 shows the percentage of observations that were under activist hedge funds’ 
ownership by S&P indices, and Table Ⅱ.5 shows the number of target firms under activist hedge 
funds’ ownership by year.  
 
Table Ⅱ.4. Percentage of observations under activist hedge funds’ ownership by S&P indices 
*The table is based on the samples that have minimum 10 Glassdoor reviews per firm-year and 
covers observations over the whole sample period. Both Thomson Reuters and FactSet 
SharkWatch lists were used to code activist hedge funds. 
 
 
Table Ⅱ.5. Number of target firms under hedge fund activism by year                                         
Year Number of target 
firms under 
activism 
Percentage Cumulative 
Percentage 
2008 8 3.08 3.08 
2009 6 2.31 5.38 
2010 8 3.08 8.46 
2011 17 6.54 15.00 
2012 18 6.92 21.92 
2013 29 11.15 33.08 
2014 41 15.77 48.85 
2015 54 20.77 69.62 
2016 45 17.31 86.92 
2017 34 13.08 100.00 
Total 260 100.00  
* The table is based on the samples that have minimum 20 Glassdoor reviews per firm-year 
 
 
 S&P 500 S&P 400 S&P 600 Non-S&P 1500 
% of observations 
under hedge fund 
activisms 
 
3.9% 
 
5.2% 
 
6.1% 
 
5.3% 
Total # of obs. 4,115 2,006 1,876 5,033 
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Together, these trends create a dilemma: long term vs. short term. While Blackrock, 
Vanguard, and State Street are expected to maintain ownership of their invested firms for 
decades, the average holding period for activist hedge funds is around 20 months (Brav, Jiang, 
Partnoy, & Thomas, 2008). Because of the difference in the length of ownership, the Big Three 
and activist hedge funds may have opposing views on how they treat workers of the invested 
firms. The CEO of Blackrock emphasizes the importance of employee training and welfare for 
firms' long-term growth. Yet, hedge fund activists focus on the efficient use of labor to improve 
operational performance and shareholder value of target firms. Due to their conflicting views, 
Laurence Fink, a CEO of Blackrock, criticized hedge fund activisms for putting pressure on 
corporate decision makers to generate short-term profit at the expense of long-term value 
creation (Blackrock, 2018).  
This dissertation explores how the recent changes in the US capital market and the 
following tension between short-term vs. long-term focus affect firms' labor relations. How do 
these changes in the capital market affect firms' attention to human capital? Also, how do 
employees respond to these changes? 
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CHAPTER Ⅲ 
 
 Context – Managing Human Capital  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Human capital is the physical and mental abilities of people that can raise real income in 
the future (Becker, 1962). Gary Becker, a Nobel Laureate economist whose seminal book, Human 
Capital, explained that human capital investment not only includes the on-the-job training and 
schooling that increase knowledge and skill, but also includes investment in people’s emotional 
health and morale, which increases motivation and intensity of work. In the context of a business 
organization, human capital is employees’ physical and mental abilities that are used to achieve 
organizational goals. As such, human capital management refers to a firm’s management of its 
employees’ physical and mental abilities to achieve the company’s goals.  
How do researchers measure human capital? Unlike physical capital, measuring the level 
of firms’ human capital is challenging because it is intangible. In order to measure firms’ human 
capital, many organizational researchers use employee surveys or observe the existence of 
management practices and policies that are known to positively affect human capital. Some finance 
researchers use SG&A (selling, general, and administrative) expenses to indirectly measure 
organizational capital – a production factor that is embodied in the firm’s key talent and of which 
the efficiency is firm specific (Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou, 2013)  – which is comparable to human 
capital. There are also third-party professional organizations such as ESG/Socrates, KLD and 
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Great Place To Work Institute that collect information on firms’ human capital and human capital 
management practices. Table Ⅲ.1 shows the list of variables, operationalization strategy, and the 
data coverage that are provided by these professional organizations.  
 
Table Ⅲ.1. Existing measures of human capital management performances 
 Construct Operationalization Coverage Data source 
1 Human capital  
performance 
(0-10) 
Social score based on  
1. labor management  
2. health and safety  
3. human capital development  
4. supply chain labor standards 
2,000 
companies 
worldwide 
(in 2010) 
 
6,800 
companies 
worldwide 
(2,300+ US 
companies) 
(in 2018) 
 
 
 
 
 
MSCI ESG 
2 Diversity strength 
(0- ) 
1. CEO (-2009) 
2. representation   
3. board of directors  
4. family benefits  
5. woman/minority contracting  
6. employment of the disabled (-2009) 
7. progressive gay/lesbian policies 
(1995-) 
8. employment of underrepresented 
groups (2010-) 
8. other strengths  
 
 
 
 
 
 
S&P 500 and 
Domini 400 
(1991-2000) 
 
 
 
+1000 largest 
US companies 
(2001-2002) 
 
 
 
+3000 largest 
US companies 
(2003-present) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KLD/ 
Socrates 
3 Diversity concern 
(0- ) 
1. workforce diversity controversies  
2. non-representation (1993-) 
3. board diversity 
4. other concern (-2009) 
4 Employee 
relations strength 
(0- ) 
1. union relations strengths  
2. no layoff policy (-1993) 
3. cash profit sharing  
4. involvement  
5. strong retirement benefits (-2009) 
6. health and safety strengths (2003-) 
7. supply chain policies (2002-) 
8. other strengths  
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5 Employee 
relations concern 
(0- ) 
1. union relations concerns  
2. health and safety concerns  
3. workforce reductions (-2009) 
4. pension/benefits concerns (1992-
2009) 
5. supply chain concerns (1998) 
6. labor management relations concerns  
6 Culture 1. pay and benefits programs  
2. corporate practices  
3. others 
400+ 
companies 
Great Place to 
Work Institute 
Culture Audit 
Survey 
7 Trust 1. attitudes toward management  
2. job satisfaction  
3. fairness in the workplace  
4. camaraderie 
447,529 
workers 
 
Great Place to 
Work Institute 
Trust Index 
Employee 
Survey 
 
  
 While existing data that measure human capital and its management are useful and have 
enabled meaningful research, there are some limitations to the existing approach in measuring and 
collecting human capital data. First, many traditional surveys have limited sample coverage, 
longitudinal data, and standardized measures. It is rare to find surveys that cover more than 1,000 
companies and are repeatedly conducted over years using standardized measures. Lack of large 
samples and their longitudinal data with standardized measures reduces generalizability of the 
results, and limits causal analyses of the data.  
Second, even when third parties launch longitudinal surveys that cover a large sample, 
most data are provided after being processed based on the institutions’ own analyses. In other 
words, raw data and specific metrics that are used to produce company ranking or scores are not 
available to the public. Not having access to the raw data makes it hard to verify the data sets’ 
validity and to conduct deeper analyses.  
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Third, the existing approach to collecting data from surveys is costly in many ways. 
Conducting large-scale surveys over time not only costs substantial resources for researchers, but 
also requires nontrivial time and commitment from the employees who fill out the surveys over 
periods of time.  
Finally, measuring human capital indirectly by observing the existence of human capital-
related policies or calculating human capital-related expenses can lead to low construct validity. 
For example, some variables in KLD data are evaluated based on whether firms have strong 
initiatives or programs, however, these policies may not reflect the actual culture of the companies 
and remain symbolic. 
While measuring human capital management practices and performance is challenging, 
studying human capital management practices and performance is important in two ways. First, it 
has organizational consequences. For example, employee satisfaction, one of human capital 
management performances, is important for a company’s long-term success. An empirical analysis 
shows that employee satisfaction is positively correlated with a company’s long-run stock returns 
(Edmans, 2011). Moreover, low employee satisfaction combined with low psychological well-
being can lead to a higher likelihood of turnover (Wright & Bonett, 2007).  
Second, there is a growing need for a standardized measure of human capital management 
practices and performance. Policy makers, investors, and organizational scholars lack standard 
measures for human capital management practices and performances. For example, in July 2017, 
Human Capital Management Coalition, a group of 25 institutional investors representing over $2.9 
trillion in assets, submitted a rulemaking petition to the SEC calling for the adoption of standards 
that would require publicly listed companies to disclose information on human capital 
management policies, practices, and performance (HCM Coalition, 2017).  
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In order to address these problems in traditional approaches to measure firms’ human 
capital management practices and performances, and in response to this call for measurement, I 
suggest a new approach. The new approach involves collecting big data on public websites and 
conducting text analysis of the big data. The big data that I use in this dissertation are firms’ annual 
reports (Form 10-K) and employees’ anonymous reviews of their employers posted on a popular 
review website, Glassdoor.com (www.glassdoor.com).  
By conducting text analysis of each firm’s 10-K documents, I measure how much attention 
firms pay to their various human capital management practices. In chapter 3 of this dissertation, I 
analyze how corporate ownership affects firms’ level of attention to their human capital 
management practices and employee satisfaction. 
Also, by using employer reviews on Glassdoor.com, I measure overall employee 
satisfaction. Employee satisfaction is the level of positive attitudes employees have toward their 
companies. While employee satisfaction can have other dimensions, such as satisfaction with 
coworkers and supervisors, my research focuses on employees’ satisfaction with their companies. 
More specific methods to create these variables are explained in the method section. 
 
Text Analysis of Annual Reports (Form 10-K) 
All U.S. companies with more than $10 million in assets and a class of equity securities 
that is held by more than 2,000 owners are required to submit annual reports on Form 10-K to U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Form 10-Ks provide comprehensive information on 
firms’ business and financial condition. Every 10-K contains the following main sections: an 
overview of the company’s business, risk factors, selected financial data, management’s discussion 
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and analysis of the firm’s business results, and financial statements. SEC requires firms to submit 
10-Ks annually so that investors are aware of the firms’ fundamental information, allowing 
investors to make informed investment decisions.  
Several strengths of using Form 10-Ks to measure human capital management practices 
are as follows. First, analyzing Form 10-Ks allows researchers to study a large number of 
companies over multiple years and across companies. SEC discloses Form 10-Ks of all publicly 
traded companies and large private companies from 1993. For example, 9,839 10-Ks and 2,320 
amended 10-Ks were filed to the SEC in 2009, all of which are accessible through its website. 
Because 10-Ks have maintained a standardized format, information in each section can be 
compared across companies and years. In this dissertation, I use the risk factors section of 10-Ks 
where companies list current and potential risks that can affect the firms’ business in the future.  
Second, 10-Ks are long documents of raw data that companies write about their businesses. 
Unlike many traditional data sets that provide internally processed scores or rankings, rich text 
information from 10-Ks allows researchers to actively engage with the data and take creative 
approaches to analyze them. Because 10-Ks do not require companies to write a section about their 
human capital management practices, it is at each firm’s discretion to decide whether, what, and 
how to write about its human capital when documenting 10-Ks. Thus, I assume that a firm’s 10-
Ks are likely to reflect the management’s interpretation and view of their human capital and its 
management practices. In this dissertation, I conduct text analysis of 10-K risk factors sections to 
measure the levels of firms’ attention to their human capital and its management practices.   
Third, using 10-Ks incurs no additional cost for data collection for researchers and potential 
survey respondents. For decades, thousands of companies have been leaving their traces on the 
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web by publishing 10-Ks every year. One of the greatest benefits of using big data is that it allows 
researchers to collect quality data in an unobtrusive and cost-effective way.  
Finally, 10-Ks can capture, at a reasonably accurate level, the variations across firms in 
their human capital management practices. Companies are expected to list all the risk factors that 
may affect their businesses in the risk factors section. Therefore, companies that rely more heavily 
on their human capital and companies that pay higher attention to their human capital will list more 
human capital-related risk factors than companies that rely less on their human capital and 
companies that pay less attention to their human capital.   
I explain below how I created human capital-related measures using 10-K documents. First, 
I downloaded index files for all quarters from 2008 to 2018 from the SEC website2. For every 
filing that was submitted to SEC, index files list information on the filer’s name, filer’s CIK, form 
type, filing date, and web address of the filing document. Then, using form type and CIK, I read 
in index files for 10-Ks of companies in my sample to pandas DataFrame in Python. The first step 
resulted in 42,524 10-K documents in total.  
Second, using the web addresses in the index files and Requests module, I fetched all texts 
in the 10-K documents for all company-year observations. Next, I parsed the risk factors sections 
from 10-Ks. As a risk factors section begins with the title “Item 1A. Risk Factors” (or its minor 
variations) and it is followed by “Item 1B. Unresolved staff comments” (or its minor variations), 
I saved all strings between the two titles. For a small number of cases where “Item 1B” is absent, 
I used “Item 2. Properties” (or its minor variations) to mark the end of the section. Because titles 
are bolded, italicized, and/or underlined, I used html tags to get at titles. It is important to note that 
 
2 www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/full-index/ 
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there is one more place in 10-K where “Item 1A. Risk Factors” and “Item 1B. Unresolved staff 
comments” are used as titles – in the table of contents. Therefore, I chose the longer set of strings 
among the two fetched sets because the shorter set from the table of contents only has a page 
number in the string. In some instances where titles were not distinguished by html tags, I used 
plain texts to parse risk factors sections. As a result of the second step, I was able to parse risk 
factors sections for 40,146 10-K documents in total. 
Third, I split the risk factor section into sentences using both period and semicolon as 
delimiters. Because many companies list different types of risk factors using semicolons, it is 
reasonable to include semicolon as a delimiter. Also, during preprocessing, it is important to delete 
the periods that are not used as punctuation marks. For example, periods can be used as decimal 
points (e.g. 4.5%) and as part of domain names (e.g. .com, .org) as well as used with certain 
abbreviations (e.g. Mr., Inc., Dr.). The median number of sentences in a risk factor section is 290 
sentences. 
Fourth, using texts from the entire risk factors section, I measured the total number of 
words related to shareholders, customers, and employees to measure firms’ attention to different 
stakeholder groups. Similarly, I measured the total number of words related to stock price and 
profit to measure firms’ attention to different firm performance indices. Dictionaries used to create 
these variables can be found in Table Ⅲ.3. 
Fifth, of all the sentences in the Risk Factor section, I extracted sentences that are related 
to employees. For each company-year observation, I looped every word in every sentence in the 
Risk Factors section, and saved all sentences that had at least one word related to employees. I 
carefully selected a set of employee-related keywords based on my own analysis of 10-K 
documents. The employee-related keywords are 'employee', 'worker', 'workforce', 'personnel', 
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'staff', 'labor ', ‘labors', 'talent', 'associates', 'unionized', 'team member', 'recruits', 'sales 
representatives', and 'independent contractor'. I chose to keep a white space in the keyword ‘labor ’ 
because the keyword without a whitespace captures unrelated words such as ‘laboratory’. I also 
chose to exclude the keyword ‘union’ because it captures irrelevant words, such as ‘European 
Union’ and ‘credit union’. An example of employee-related sentences can be seen in Figure Ⅲ.1. 
As a result of the fifth step, I found 39,673 10-K documents to have at least one employee-related 
sentence in the Risk Factor section. The median number of words in the set of employee-related 
sentences is 363 words.  
 
Figure Ⅲ.1. Example of employee-related sentences in 10-K Risk Factor section (LinkedIn) 
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Sixth, I measured the level of firms’ attention to human capital by counting the number of 
words associated with knowledge, skills, and abilities (KS&A) and motivation that appear in 
employee-related sentences. I carefully selected the following keywords related to KS&A and 
practices and policies that are associated with KS&A – ' knowledge', ' skill', ' abilit', ' talent', 
'competen’, ' expert', ' creativ', ' train ', ' trained', ' training', ' recruit', ' hire', ' hiring', ' attract', ' 
retain', ' retention', and ' turnover'. In addition, I measured the level of firm’s attention to 
employee motivation which comprises of financial and non-financial motivation. Dictionaries 
used to create firms’ attention to employee motivation variables can be found in Table Ⅲ.3. 
Seventh, I measured the level of firm’s view of their employees as a resource by counting 
the number of words associated with resource that appear in employee-related sentences. 
Resource-related keywords are ' invention', ' innovat', ' knowledge', ' skill', ' abilit', ' talent', ' 
competen', ' expert', ' creativ', ' motivat', ' morale', ' engagement', ' empower', and ' satisf'. 
Similarly, I measured the level of firm’s view of their employees as a cost by counting the 
number of words associated with cost that appear in employee-related sentences. Cost-related 
keywords are ' cost ', ' costs ',' expense', ' expend', ' liabilit', 'strike', 'collective bargain', 'dispute', 
'stoppage', 'labor disturbance', 'labor disruption', 'employee fraud', 'misconduct', 'employee theft', 
'wrongful conduct', and 'malfeasance'. Example sentences that reflect resource-based and cost-
based view of employees can be found in Table Ⅲ.2.  
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Table Ⅲ.2. Examples of Risk Factors that reflect resource- and cost-based view of employees 
 Resource-based view of employees Cost-based view of employees 
1 Our business depends on our ability to 
attract and retain talented employees. 
[Microsoft, 2016] 
Some of our and our suppliers’ workforces 
are represented by labor unions, which may 
lead to work stoppages. [Boeing, 2014] 
2 Currently in Northern California, there is 
increasing competition for talented 
individuals with the specialized knowledge 
of electric vehicles, software engineers, 
manufacturing engineers and other skilled 
employees and this competition affects both 
our ability to retain key employees and hire 
new ones. [Tesla, 2014] 
Over the last several years, we have 
significantly reduced operating costs by 
reducing staff and employee benefits and 
implementing general cost-control 
measures across the Company, and we plan 
to continue these cost management efforts. 
[New York Times, 2013] 
3 In addition, we compete with other retail 
businesses for many of our associates in 
hourly positions, and we invest significant 
resources in training and motivating them 
to maintain a high level of job satisfaction. 
[Home Depot, 2012] 
Strikes, work stoppages or other forms of 
labor unrest at any of our major 
manufacturing facilities or at our or our 
major bottlers' plants could impair our 
ability to supply concentrates and syrups to 
our bottling partners or our bottlers' ability 
to supply finished beverages to customers, 
which would reduce our net operating 
revenues and could expose us to customer 
claims. [Coca Cola, 2011] 
4 If we fail to effectively manage our hiring 
needs and successfully integrate our new 
hires, our efficiency and ability to meet our 
forecasts and our employee morale, 
productivity and retention could suffer, and 
our business and operating results could be 
adversely affected. [LinkedIn, 2014] 
 
Our ability to control labor costs is subject 
to numerous external factors, including 
prevailing wage rates and health and other 
insurance costs, as well as the impact of 
legislation or regulations governing labor 
relations or healthcare benefits. [Home 
Depot, 2012] 
5 Because payroll costs are a major component of the operating expenses at our properties, 
a shortage of skilled labor could also require higher wages that would increase our labor 
costs, which could reduce our profits and the profits of our third-party owners. [Hyatt 
Hotels, 2015] 
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 Table Ⅲ.3 shows the full list of dictionaries that are used to create variables from the risk 
factors section in 10-K. When coming up with the final dictionaries, I referred to the dictionaries 
used by (Vergauwen, Bollen, & Oirbans, 2007).  
When running regression analysis, I controlled for the total number of sentences in the 
risk factors section because the longer the companies’ risk factors section, the more likely the 
firms will mention the chosen key words.  
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Table Ⅲ.3. Dictionaries used to create variables from 10-K risk factors section 
Variables Dictionaries Notes Variables 
 
In risk factors sections 
 
 
 
Employees 
 
 
'employee', 'worker', 'workforce',  
'labor ', ‘labors', 'talent', 'associates', 
'unionized', 'personnel', 'staff', 'team 
member', 'recruits', 'sales 
representatives', 'independent 
contractor' 
Excluded 'labor' (which gets at 
'laboratory') and 'union' (which gets at 
'european union' and 'credit union', etc.) 
 
 
Employees 
 
 
Customers ' customer', ' consumer'  Customers 
Shareholders ' shareholder', ' shareowner'  Shareholders 
 
Profit 
' profit', ' return on asset',  
' return on earning', ' return on 
equity', ' return on investment', ' 
return on capital' 
  
Profit 
Stock price ' share price', ' stock price', ' eps',  
' earnings per share' 
 Stock price 
 
In employee-related sentences in risk factors sections 
 
 
1. Human Capital 
 
 
 
1-1. Knowledge, 
Skill, and Ability 
(KS&A) 
' knowledge', ' skill', ' abilit', ' 
talent', ' competen', ' expert', ' 
creativ' 
Excluded 'invest' (which is 
disproportionately more likely to occur in 
investment firms’ 10-K), 'asset' (which is 
often used to describe financial asset), 
'resource’, 'intellectual propert', and 
'patent' (which are often used in 
irrelevant contexts) 
 
 
 
 
KSA-broad 
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a. training ' train ', ' trained', ' training'  
b. recruitment ' recruit', ' hire', ' hiring', ' attract'  
c. retention ' retain', ' retention'  
d. turnover ' turnover'  
1-2. Motivation 
 
' motivat', ' morale', ' engagement', ' 
empower', ' satisf' 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Motivation 
-broad 
a. compensation ' compensat'   
 
 
Finanacial 
motivation 
b. salary ' wage', ' salary'  
c. employee stock 
ownership 
' equity', ' shares', 'stock option', 
'stock ownership', 'employee stock' 
 
d. benefits ' benefits', ' pension', ' 401k' Excluded 'insurance' and 'health' as they 
are more likely to occur in insurance and 
healthcare companies’ 10-K  
e. culture ' culture'   
 
Non-
financial 
motivation 
f. diversity ' diversity', ' diverse'  
g. equity 'equal employment', 'equal 
opportunit', ' eeo ' 
 
h. growth opportunity 'career advanc', 'career develop', 
'professional growth opportunit' 
 
i. purpose ' purpose'  
j. welfare 'welfare', 'well-being', 'wellness'  
 
2. Senior Management 
 
 
2. Senior 
management 
 
'ceo', 'executive', 'senior 
management', 'president', 'chief', 
'management team', 'management 
personnel' 
Excluded 'management' (as it is often 
used to describe the business instead of 
people) and 'key' (as it may refer to non-
senior management employees) 
 
Senior management 
 
3. Resource vs. Cost-based view of human capital 
 
3-1 Resource ' invention', ' innovat'   
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a. Knowledge, Skill, 
and Ability (KS&A) 
' knowledge', ' skill', ' abilit', ' 
talent', ' competen', ' expert', ' 
creativ' 
  
 
Resource-broad 
b. Motivation 
 
' motivat', ' morale', ' engagement', 
' empower', ' satisf' 
 
 
3-2 Cost  
' cost ', ' costs ',' expense', ' expend', 
' liabilit' 
Excluded 'profit' and 'productivity' as 
they can be used in both resource- and 
cost- related contexts 
 
 
 
 
Cost-broad 
 
 
a. collective action 'strike', 'collective bargain', 
'dispute', 'stoppage', 'labor 
disturbance', 'labor disruption' 
Selected factors that cost firms profit or 
limit ordinary operations 
 
b. misconduct 'employee fraud', 'misconduct', 
'employee theft', 'wrongful 
conduct', 'malfeasance' 
 
* White spaces in the dictionaries are left intentionally.  
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How commonly do companies list employee-related issues in their risk factors section? 
Based on 37,644 10-K documents, the median number of employee-related words that appeared 
in the risk factors section was 13 while the median number of customer-related words that appeared 
in the risk factors section was 19. To put it simply, when companies discuss how their customers 
can influence their future businesses 10 times, they discuss how their employees can influence 
their future businesses approximately 7 times. The result shows that employee-related issues are 
commonly discussed in risk factors sections and are considered as an important factor that affects 
companies’ businesses. Figure Ⅲ.2 shows the median number of word occurrences in risk factors 
sections for words related to customers, employees, profit, stock price, and shareholders. 
 
Figure Ⅲ.2. Median number of word occurrences in risk factors section for selected themes 
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Then, what employee-related issues do companies talk about in risk factors sections? Based 
on 36,841 10-K documents, companies are most likely to discuss the knowledge, skill, and abilities 
(KS&A) of their employees, recruitment and retention, cost associated with employee 
management, and senior management in the order of frequency. This analysis shows that 
companies are most interested and depend on employees’ KS&A and recruitment. Figure Ⅲ.3 
shows the median number of word occurrences in employee-related sentences in risk factors 
section for several chosen themes. 
 
Figure Ⅲ.3. Median number of word occurrences in employee-related sentences in risk factors 
section for selected themes 
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Anonymous Company Reviews on Glassdoor 
Glassdoor, Inc. was founded in 2007 by Tim Besse, Robert Hohman, and Rich Barton. 
Rich Barton, who was a CEO of Zillow Group, came up with the initial business idea for Glassdoor 
when he accidentally printed out and left a copy of a performance review spreadsheet with every 
Zillow employee's salary, title, review rating, and stock options on the common printer. When his 
assistant pulled the copy into his office later telling him that the copy did not look like it should be 
on the common printer, he thought, 'Well, why not?' He thought people could find and get jobs 
that are right fit for them when they have access to more information on salaries and company 
reviews. As a founder of Expedia and Zillow, Rich Barton knew that this idea could once again 
give power to the people. He pitched the idea to Robert Hohman, one of the first engineers at 
Expedia, and Tim Besse, another former colleague at Expedia who oversaw product management. 
The three people co-founded Glassdoor in 2007 and launched their anonymous company review 
website in June 2008. In the beginning, the co-founders had to ask their friends to leave their salary 
information and company reviews, but it did not take long for their business to gain traction around 
the globe. 
Figure Ⅲ.4 and Figure Ⅲ.5 are examples of anonymous company reviews posted on 
Glassdoor. Both former and current employees can rate their companies using a 5-star review 
system. In addition to rating the overall satisfaction, employees rate five specific dimensions of 
their companies - work/life balance, culture and values, career opportunities, compensation and 
benefits, and senior management - also using 5-star ratings. When reviewing companies, reviewers 
are also required to share some of the best reasons to work (pros) and some of the downsides of 
working (cons) at their companies using a minimum five words. Reviewers can also rate whether 
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they recommend their companies to their friends, how they evaluate their companies' business 
outlook, and whether they approve of their CEOs. 
 
Figure Ⅲ.4. Example of anonymous company review on Glassdoor (overall satisfaction)  
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Figure Ⅲ.5. Example of anonymous company review on Glassdoor  
(individual dimensions) 
 
Glassdoor built in several mechanisms into their website to make sure that employees' 
truthful opinions are represented fairly. First, Glassdoor protects reviewers' anonymity so that 
reviewers feel safe to share their honest opinions. Glassdoor never displays reviewers' profile 
information next to their contribution, and no one can see reviewers' personal information in their 
user profile. Reviewers can also choose not to include their location and job title which could 
indirectly identify themselves. 
Second, Glassdoor prevents and monitors fraudulent activities. Glassdoor prevents 
individuals from gaming the system by allowing each individual one review per employer per year. 
Glassdoor also verifies employees by requiring email verification from their active email addresses 
or valid SNS accounts. When users flag reviews or when its proprietary technology detects 
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potential fraudulent reviews, Glassdoor's Content Moderation team takes a closer look and 
removes the reviews when deemed appropriate. While Glassdoor does not delete reviews simply 
because they are highly or lowly rated, it removes reviews when it has evidence that reviewers 
were incentivized or coerced into leaving the contents.    
Finally, Glassdoor adopted “Give to Get (GTG)” policy to reduce sampling bias. If 
reviewers are not given any incentives to post their reviews, employees with extremely negative 
or positive opinion on their companies are more likely to post reviews on Glassdoor than 
employees with moderate opinions. GTG policy is designed to provide incentive to employees 
with moderate opinion of their companies to post reviews. GTG policy only allows Glassdoor 
users to submit their own reviews of their companies after having viewed three pieces of content 
and gaining unlimited access to the site's content. Researchers found that GTG policy reduced the 
likelihood of extreme 1-star and 5-star reviews by 3.6% and 2.1% points respectively while raising 
the likelihood of 3-star and 4-star reviews by 2.6% and 2.9% points (Marinescu, Klein, 
Chamberlain, & Smart, 2018). As for the control group, researchers used reviews that were posted 
immediately before the reviewers were prompted by the GTG policy and reviews that were posted 
by the reviewers who have already posted a review in the past. 
Data from Glassdoor is widely used among management researchers. A growing number 
of researchers use Glassdoor’s company review data to measure firms’ culture (Corritore, 
Goldberg, & Srivastava, 2019; Marchetti, 2018), employee satisfaction (Luo, Zhou, & Shon, 2016), 
work-life balance (Chandra, 2012), and CEO approval by employees (Babenko & Sen, 2014). A 
team of researchers also identified seven values that employees care about when evaluating 
employers by using Glassdoor review data (Dabirian, Kietzmann, & Diba, 2017). Similar to 
Fortune’s Best Companies to Work For, many studies use Glassdoor’s Best Places To Work, a list 
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of companies that scored high on employee ratings on Glassdoor (Butler, Armstrong, Ellinger, & 
Franke, 2016; Dineen & Allen, 2016). Moreover, when ranking America's best-run companies, 
The Drucker Institute uses Glassdoor data as one of the measurements for employee engagement 
and development. Prior research shows that Glassdoor’s overall satisfaction ratings moderately 
correlate with traditional employee satisfaction surveys (i.e. Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey) 
(r = 0.516, p = 0.007), supporting the validity of the Glassdoor rating as a measure of overall 
employee satisfaction at the organizational level (Landers, Brusso, & Auer, 2019). 
Glassdoor data shows that the total number of employer reviews newly posted on 
Glassdoor has been continuously increasing since 2008 when Glassdoor first launched its website. 
As can be seen in the Table Ⅲ.4, the number of newly posted reviews in the U.S. increased from 
44,293 in 2008 to 1,340,199 in 2017.  
 
Table Ⅲ.4. Number of reviews newly posted on Glassdoor by year 
Year # of reviews newly posted on Glassdoor 
2008      44,293 
2009      47,086 
2010      67,998 
2011      91,666 
2012    156,990 
2013    369,460 
2014    674,368 
2015 1,108,616 
2016 1,243,500 
2017 1,340,199 
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As shown in Figure Ⅲ.6, the largest proportion of reviews consist of 4-star and 3-star 
ratings. 4-star ratings make up 28% of reviews, and 3-star ratings make up 26% of the total reviews. 
On the other hand, the total reviews consist of only 12% 1-star and 14% 2-star ratings.  5-star 
overall ratings make up 19% of reviews. The results are based on 1,380,734 reviews of U.S. public 
companies that were posted on Glassdoor from 2008 to early 2018. 
 
Figure Ⅲ.6. Percentage of each star-rating on Glassdoor 
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When overall ratings are aggregated and averaged by year and company, the distribution 
of the averaged ratings takes the form of bell-shape. Figure Ⅲ.7 shows the distribution of 7,747 
averaged overall ratings.       
 
Figure Ⅲ.7. Distribution of aggregated average overall ratings 
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Figure Ⅲ.8 shows the average of overall rating and the average of each individual 
dimension of companies on Glassdoor. The average overall rating is 3.27, and the average of 
individual dimension range from 2.85 (senior leadership) to 3.26 (compensation/benefits). 
 
Figure Ⅲ.8. Average rating of employee satisfaction 
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What companies are rated high in my sample? Table Ⅲ.5 lists the names of 15 
companies (firm-year observations) in S&P500 index with the highest overall rating. Eastman 
Chemical, Southwest Airlines, and Facebook ranked top 15 for multiple years during the study 
period.  
 
Table Ⅲ.5. Top 15 company-year observations (in S&P 500) with the highest ratings  
 
Top S&P 500 companies Overall Rating Year 
1 Equity Residential 4.79 2018 
2 Eastman Chemical Co 4.62 2013 
3 Illumina Inc 4.61 2018 
4 Southwest Airlines Co 4.61 2008 
5 Facebook Inc 4.58 2017 
6 Nvidia Corp 4.57 2017 
7 Intuitive Surgical Inc 4.55 2017 
8 Pioneer Natural Resources Co 4.55 2016 
9 Eastman Chemical Co 4.52 2014 
10 Southwest Airlines Co 4.49 2018 
11 Southwest Airlines Co 4.45 2009 
12 Eversource Energy 4.44 2018 
13 Facebook Inc 4.44 2014 
14 Alphabet Inc 4.44 2017 
15 Facebook Inc 4.43 2015 
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On the other hand, Table Ⅲ.6 lists the names of 15 companies (firm-year observations) in 
S&P500 index with the lowest overall rating. Public Storage and Express Scripts Holding ranked 
bottom 15 for multiple years during the study period.  
 
Table Ⅲ.6. Bottom 15 company-year observations (in S&P 500) with the lowest ratings  
 
Bottom S&P 500 companies 
Overall 
Rating 
Year 
1 Public Storage 1.72 2011 
2 Family Dollar Stores Inc 1.94 2010 
3 Public Storage 1.95 2012 
4 Frontier Communications Corp 2.08 2011 
5 Express Scripts Holding Co 2.12 2011 
6 United States Steel Corp 2.17 2012 
7 International Game Technology 2.18 2011 
8 Express Scripts Holding Co 2.19 2010 
9 Express Scripts Holding Co 2.21 2013 
10 Kraft Heinz Co 2.21 2018 
11 Paccar Inc 2.23 2010 
12 Welltower Inc 2.25 2017 
13 Fastenal Co 2.28 2010 
14 Xilinx Inc 2.28 2009 
15 Public Storage 2.28 2013 
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Table Ⅲ.7 lists the names of 15 companies (firm-year observations) in S&P400 index 
with the highest overall rating. Ultimate Software Group and Silicon Laboratories ranked top 15 
for multiple years during the study period. It is notable that overall employee ratings for top 15 
S&P400 companies which range from 4.24 to 4.62 are lower than overall employee ratings for 
top 15 S&P 500 companies which range from 4.43 to 4.79. 
 
Table Ⅲ.7. Top 15 company-year observations (in S&P 400) with the highest ratings  
 
Top S&P 400 companies Overall Rating Year 
1 Ultimate Software Group Inc 4.62 2017 
2 Silicon Laboratories Inc 4.61 2017 
3 Ultimate Software Group Inc 4.60 2016 
4 Ultimate Software Group Inc 4.58 2015 
5 Primerica Inc 4.53 2018 
6 Abiomed Inc 4.46 2017 
7 Ultimate Software Group Inc 4.43 2014 
8 Amc Networks Inc 4.38 2014 
9 Resmed Inc 4.37 2016 
10 Viasat Inc 4.32 2017 
11 Littelfuse Inc 4.29 2017 
12 Oshkosh Corp 4.27 2017 
13 Healthcare Services Group Inc 4.27 2018 
14 Silicon Laboratories Inc 4.25 2016 
15 Ultimate Software Group Inc 4.24 2018 
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On the other hand, Table Ⅲ.8 lists the names of 15 companies (firm-year observations) in 
S&P400 index with the lowest overall rating. International Bancshares ranked bottom 15 for 
multiple years during the study period.  
 
Table Ⅲ.8. Bottom 15 company-year observations (in S&P 400) with the lowest ratings 
 
Bottom S&P 400 companies Overall Rating Year 
1 Firstmerit Corp 1.68 2014 
2 Uti Worldwide Inc 1.97 2013 
3 Clean Harbors Inc 2.02 2014 
4 Micros Systems Inc 2.03 2009 
5 Service Corp International 2.08 2011 
6 International Bancshares Corp 2.09 2012 
7 International Bancshares Corp 2.10 2014 
8 Cdk Global Inc 2.14 2018 
9 Verifone Systems Inc 2.15 2016 
10 Washington Federal Inc 2.15 2015 
11 Corrections Corp of America 2.16 2012 
12 3d Systems Corp 2.16 2014 
13 International Bancshares Corp 2.19 2013 
14 Astoria Financial Corp 2.19 2013 
15 Vca Inc 2.20 2014 
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Figure Ⅲ.9 shows the average employee rating for companies in each S&P category from 
2008 to 2018. Employees working for S&P500 firms show the highest average satisfaction, 
followed by employees working for S&P400 firms and non-S&P1500 firms. Employees working 
for S&P600 firms show the lowest average satisfaction. 
 
Figure Ⅲ.9. Average employee rating of companies in each S&P category 
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Table Ⅲ.9 shows pairwise correlations among variables from Glassdoor and 10-K data. 
The results show that overall satisfaction and satisfaction with individual dimensions are highly 
and significantly correlated. The correlation between an overall satisfaction and satisfaction with 
senior leadership is the highest (r=0.91), while the correlation between satisfaction with 
compensation/benefits and work-life balance is the lowest (r=0.56). Among measures from 10-K, 
the number of words related to motivation (e.g. compensation, salary, benefits, etc.) is highly and 
significantly correlated with the number of words related to cost-based view of employees 
(r=0.49). Also, the number of words related to motivation is highly and significantly correlated 
with the number of words related to knowledge, skills, and abilities of employees (r=0.35).   
Regarding correlations between variables from Glassdoor and 10-K data, it is notable that 
all employee satisfaction variables from Glassdoor are negatively and significantly correlated 
with the number of words related to profits and a cost-based view of employees from 10-K data. 
On the other hand, most employee satisfaction variables from Glassdoor (except for satisfaction 
with compensation/benefits) are positively and significantly correlated with the number of words 
related to a resource-based view of employees from 10-K data.  
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Table Ⅲ.9. Pairwise correlations 
 
 
Pairwise correlations  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
 
(1) overall rating 
 
(2) career opportunity 0.87* 
 
(3) compensation/ benefits 0.71* 0.68* 
 
(4) culture 0.86* 0.77* 0.59* 
 
(5) senior leadership 0.91* 0.85* 0.63* 0.84* 
 
(6) work-life balance 0.75* 0.62* 0.56* 0.73* 0.72* 
 
(7) # employee words -0.04* -0.01 -0.17* -0.03* -0.03* -0.11* 
 
(8) # profit words -0.05* -0.05* -0.11* -0.03* -0.04* -0.09* 0.17* 
 
(9) # shareholder words -0.01 -0.02 -0.03* -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.06* 0.01 
 
(10) # stock price words -0.03* -0.02* -0.04* -0.00 -0.02 0.04* 0.10* -0.03* 0.01 
 
(11) # KS&A_broad words -0.00 0.03* -0.10* 0.03* 0.02* 0.00 0.62* 0.13* -0.04* 0.17* 
 
(12) # motivation_broad words -0.04* -0.01 -0.13* -0.01 -0.02 -0.07* 0.61* 0.14* -0.03* 0.09* 0.35* 
 
(13) # resource_broad words 0.04* 0.06* -0.03* 0.05* 0.04* 0.03* 0.49* 0.10* -0.02* 0.10* 0.84* 0.33* 
 
(14) # cost_broad words -0.06* -0.03* -0.12* -0.07* -0.06* -0.16* 0.62* 0.17* -0.04* -0.03* 0.23* 0.49* 0.20* 
 
 
* shows significance at the .05 level  
# words related to each theme (from (7) to (14)) are total number of words related to each theme divided by the total number of sentences in the risk 
factors section 
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CHAPTER Ⅳ 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter Ⅱ and Chapter Ⅲ, large index funds are increasing their ownership 
of American corporations and activist hedge funds are imposing greater threats to firms of various 
sizes and performances. What do these two trends mean for employee relations? Activist hedge 
funds often aim to achieve their goals in a short period of time, usually between a few months and 
a few years. Activist hedge funds try to control the board of their target companies and demand 
policy changes. Hedge fund activism can increase the value of the company in the short term, but 
it may be done at the expense of longer-term development and other stakeholders’ interests. A 
target company’s management can become short sighted and reduce long-term investments in 
areas such as research and development, brand loyalty, and employee development and welfare. 
Hedge fund campaigns may often include layoffs and reductions in employee benefits, which can 
directly harm employee welfare and workplace culture.  
On the other hand, increasing ownership concentration by passive index funds can help 
management keep a long-term view of its company, as passive index funds hold their stocks for a 
very long period of time. For example, Larry Fink, a CEO of Blackrock, sent a letter to the CEOs 
of its firms in the beginning of 2019 to highlight the importance of investing the company’s time 
and resources to foster the long-term value of their firms. Passive index fund managers can help 
their firms maintain and develop sustainable businesses that benefit their employees. In sum, I will 
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describe in this chapter the effect of corporate ownership by index funds and activist hedge funds 
on employee satisfaction through changes in firms’ level of attention to their human capital. 
 
Characteristics of shareholders and employee satisfaction 
 
What is the relationship between shareholders, managers, and employees? The relationship 
between the shareholders and managers can be explained by agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Agency theory views an organization as a nexus of contracts and suggests that a separation of 
decision management and residual risk bearing leads to decision systems that separate 
management (i.e., initiation and implementation) and control (i.e., ratification and monitoring). 
Agency theory explains that in complex organizations, the benefits of diffused residual claims and 
separation of decision making from residual risk bearing are greater than the agency costs they 
generate. In other words, the managers of a company initiate and implement policies, while the 
shareholders ratify and monitor the managers. In practice, members of the board of directors, who 
are elected by shareholders, not only oversee managers but also form friendships with CEOs, 
through which they provide ongoing advice on firms’ strategic issues (Westphal, 1999). 
Coase (1937) helps us understand the relationship between managers and employees. 
Coase suggests that organizations emerge because using price mechanisms involves costs—
negotiation cost and contracting cost—that organizations can reduce. An organization is likely to 
arise when a short-term contract is unsatisfactory due to uncertainty and difficulty of forecasting. 
This means that because the employees’ duties cannot be specified in advance, organizations arise 
as an alternative system to the market. In an organization, employees are paid wages in exchange 
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for being under the control of their managers’ authority. Mangers tell employees when to work, 
what work to do, and how to do it.  
 If we combine the agency theory, Coase’s view of the nature of the firm, and the business 
laws upon which corporations are based, we can form a more complete understanding of the 
relationship between the shareholders, managers, and employees. Managers and boards of 
directors have the discretion to decide what policies to initiate and implement, but shareholders 
ratify and monitor the managers’ decisions, which will have a consequential impact on their 
employees’ lives at work. In theory, managers can initiate and implement policies that can greatly 
benefit employees at the shareholders’ expense. This scenario is possible because American 
corporate law protects directors’ power to sacrifice shareholder value in the pursuit of other 
corporate goals (Stout, 2012). For example, a business judgment rule gives directors the authority 
to pursue goals other than shareholder value, such as increasing employee benefits or developing 
customer services. On the other hand, managers can also initiate and implement policies that 
significantly harm employees’ welfare if shareholders ratify or even exert pressure on the 
management to make shareholder value a priority. This possibility is consistent with one criticism 
of agency theory: While agency theory focuses on agent opportunism, principal opportunism can 
also exist and may even be more likely to occur (Perrow, 1986).  
 Before going into the next section about the shareholders’ influence on employees through 
the firms’ management, it is worth understanding managerial preferences. What goals do managers 
pursue when they are not closely monitored by shareholders, or when they have a minimal stake 
in the public firm? First, the empire-building model suggests that managers prefer increased 
influence and assets under control, as opposed to optimal allocation of resources. Under this model, 
managers would increase the size of their firms through mergers and acquisitions even when it 
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might not benefit their shareholders. Second, the quiet-life model suggests that managers prefer a 
peaceful life in the workplace through improved workplace relations with their workers. An 
empirical study supports this model by showing that antitakeover laws generated increases in 
workers’ wages by about 1% for production workers and 4% for white-collar workers without 
increasing the operating efficiency of the plants (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003). In sum, existing 
theories suggest that managers who have a minimal stake in the firm and are not closely monitored 
by shareholders have a neutral to positive preference for improved workplace relationships with 
their employees.    
 
Shareholder engagement 
Activist shareholders with different interests are increasing their influence on corporate 
governance (Davis & Thompson, 1994). The Council of Institutional Investors outlines different 
methods of shareholder engagement, including engaging with portfolio companies in a private 
dialogue, filing shareholder proposals, nominating corporate directors, and filing a lawsuit (CII, 
2012). I will first explain the activism initiated by hedge funds, and then explain the engagement 
by institutional investors that operate passive index funds.  
 
1. Hedge funds and their activism against target companies 
Hedge funds are investment funds that are often organized as a limited partnership or a 
limited liability company. They pool funds from accredited investors to invest in a variety of assets 
in an effort to make a positive return. Accredited investors, such as institutional investors or 
wealthy individuals, are those who have the minimum required level of income or assets. Hedge 
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funds are similar to mutual funds in that they pool investors’ money; however, they are distinct 
from mutual funds in the following ways. First, hedge funds are not subject to some of the 
government regulations that apply to mutual funds and are designed to protect investors. For 
example, hedge funds are not required to provide disclosure to the same level as mutual funds. 
This lack of transparency makes it difficult for investors to verify hedge fund managers’ 
representation of the fund’s track record and, in extreme cases, makes it easier for hedge fund 
managers to defraud investors. Second, hedge fund managers charge a very high performance fee, 
usually about 20 percent of the hedge fund’s profit. Such high performance fees motivate hedge 
fund managers to take greater risks and try diverse investment strategies to generate a larger return.  
What are the characteristics of the target firms? Previous empirical research shows that 
hedge funds’ target firms have low market value relative to book value, pay their CEOs 
considerably more than comparable companies, have more takeover defenses, and have higher 
institutional ownership and trading liquidity (Brav et al., 2008). The results of Brav et al. suggest 
that hedge funds target companies with high institutional holdings because activist hedge funds, 
which have a median ownership stake of 9.1% in their sample, rely on cooperation from 
management or, in its absence, support from fellow shareholders. This interpretation seems 
reasonable in that it is more efficient for activist hedge funds to cooperate with a few institutional 
block holders who support their agenda than it is to cooperate with dispersed retail investors.3 
Hedge funds also target firms with high levels of cash on hand, and demand that the company buy 
back its own shares, cut the CEO’s compensation, and initiate dividends (Klein & Zur, 2009). 
 
3 The fact that activist hedge funds try to cooperate with institutional investors to pursue their agenda seems to 
partially explain why previous research finds mixed results on the effect of institutional ownership on a target firm’s 
corporate governance.  
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What is the effect of hedge fund activism on the target company? Previous research shows 
that the market reacts favorably to hedge fund activism because hedge funds can reduce agency 
cost by acting as informed monitors of the target firms’ management. Empirical research found 
that the filing of a Schedule 13D informing activist funds’ investment in target firms leads to 
positive average abnormal returns of approximately 7% during the (-20, +20) announcement 
window (Brav et al., 2008) and 10.2% over the (-30, +30) announcement window (Klein & Zur, 
2009). Additionally, these studies show that the positive returns at announcement are not reversed 
over time, and that hedge fund activism brings about significantly positive returns over the 
subsequent year. Brav et al. also shows that overall performance of the target firms increases: The 
target firms show improvement in book value leverage, return on assets, and operating profit 
margins (Brav et al., 2008). However, the positive shareholder return after hedge fund activism is 
not always found in other countries. In Japan, for example, where shareholder primacy is not 
generally accepted, market perception of the target firms was unfavorable at the time of hedge 
fund activism, and there were no enduring changes in the target firms’ financial performance after 
the hedge fund activism (Buchanan, Chai, & Deakin, 2018).  
 
2. Passive index funds and their engagement with their portfolio firms 
An index fund is a mutual fund or exchange-traded fund (ETF) that tracks the components 
of a market index, such as the S&P 500 or Russell 2000. The first index fund was created in 1975 
by John C. Bogle, the founder of The Vanguard Group, and the demand for index funds has been 
increasing since then. Unlike actively managed funds, whose fund managers rely on their own 
experience and judgement to make investment decisions, index funds rely on computer algorithms 
and require little human input. As a result, index funds have a powerful advantage over actively 
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managed funds: extremely low operating and management costs. Compared to actively managed 
funds, index funds can save active trading costs, annual fees, and large performance fees paid to 
fund managers. As the legendary investor Warren Buffett forecasted (in Berkshire Hathaway’s 
2005 annual report), investors increasingly fled from actively managed funds to lower-cost index 
funds and exchange-traded funds. Blackrock also shifted its investment strategy from active 
management to data-mining and technology-based management. 
How did the massive shift from active investment to passive investment affect asset 
management companies’ engagement with their portfolio firms? Before the financial crisis in 2008, 
even when mutual funds became the most significant corporate owners in the United States since 
the mid-1990s, mutual funds have been reluctant to exert direct influence over corporate 
governance (Davis, 2008). For example, while Fidelity was the largest shareholder in the US, its 
fund managers actively managed the funds and routinely liquidated its ownership, choosing to exit 
rather than voicing their discontent with the firms (Davis, 2008). However, since the financial 
crisis in 2008, investors have fled from actively managed investments to lower-cost, passively 
managed investments such as index funds and exchange-traded funds (Fichtner et al., 2017). As a 
result, as long as a company remains in the relevant index, asset management companies become 
long-term stockholders of the company regardless of their view of the company. Since asset 
management companies cannot express their disapproval by selling their shares of a specific 
company in an index, they choose to voice their opinions to and increase their engagement with 
the portfolio firms’ management.  
What, then, are some of the issues that index fund investors try to raise with their companies? 
A series of surveys of institutional investors between 2012 and 2013 by McCahery, Sautner, and 
Starks (2016) show that institutional investors are most likely to engage with their portfolio firms’ 
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management when the portfolio firms have inadequate corporate governance, when management 
receives excessive compensation, when the firms have poor corporate strategy, or when the firms 
show poor financial performance relative to their peers. On the other hand, there are reasons 
institutional investors may not engage with their portfolio firms. Institutional investors’ 
engagement with their portfolio firms can be hindered by multiple factors, such as a free rider 
problem; having too small of a stake in a firm, limited personnel, or a conflict of interest (Davis & 
Kim, 2007); or concerns about breaching “acting in concert” rules (McCahery, Sautner, & Starks, 
2016).     
Empirical findings on the effect of increased ownership by passive index funds on 
corporate governance are mixed. For example, Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2017) find that an 
exogenous increase in passive institutional ownership caused higher agency costs in the sample 
period between 1992 and 2010. Specifically, an exogenous increase in passive institutional 
ownership increased the likelihood that the CEO would become the chairman and president, 
reduced the number of new independent director appointments, and lowered M&A announcement 
returns (Schmidt & Fahlenbrach, 2017). On the other hand, Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016) find 
that passive mutual funds resulted in improved corporate governance in the sample period between 
1998 and 2006. More specifically, passive mutual funds increased the percentage of independent 
directors, increased the likelihood that a firm would remove a shareholder rights plan, and 
increased the likelihood that a firm would eliminate restrictions on shareholders’ ability to call 
special meetings (Appel, Gormley, & Keim, 2016).  
Even though there is growing attention to how hedge funds and passive index funds affect 
shareholder value and corporate governance, we lack systematic research on their impact on 
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employees. In the next section, I provide hypotheses on how increased ownership of a firm by 
hedge funds and passive index funds can affect employee satisfaction.   
 
Hypotheses 
 
1. Hedge fund activism and employee satisfaction 
Hedge fund activism can negatively affect employees in the target firm through the 
following two mechanisms. First, hedge fund activists launch campaigns that can increase the 
target firm’s shareholder value, but many of them may come at the expense of employees’ interests 
and benefits. Hedge fund activists may increase shareholder value by spinning off part of the 
company and by cutting the target company’s operating cost through outsourcing, downsizing, and 
reducing employee benefit packages and training. For employees, these changes can mean losing 
their job, getting a lower salary, and spending more of their own money for their medical care and 
training, often with short notice or no notice at all. Employees and their dependents who are 
directly affected by these changes may suffer a high level of anxiety and stress, which lowers their 
satisfaction.    
For example, in the fourth quarter of 2016, Third Point hedge fund acquired 0.18% of the 
shares of Honeywell International and pressured the management to shed its aerospace business 
by claiming that the spinoff would increase shareholder value in excess of $20 billion. In October 
2017, after many simulations, the management team announced that it would retain its aerospace 
business unit but would spin off its car parts and home systems business units. During the hedge 
fund campaigns, employees suffered from a series of layoffs and reduced benefits. Several 
examples of employee discontent can be found on the anonymous review website, Glassdoor: 
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“Senior management seems to be short-term focused. There have been several rounds of layoffs 
and furloughs in the last year.” “You are expected to train yourself and on your own time and 
money.” “Employee benefits have been reduced in recent years—cut 401K matching in half, 
eliminated work from home option—evidences that upper management does not greatly value its 
workforce. Main focus now is to meet AOP [Annual Operations Plan] in the short term at all costs.” 
As these quotations show, the policy and strategic changes demanded by hedge fund activists may 
be an effective way to increase the current share price for the shareholders, but they may do so by 
compromising other stakeholders’ well-being and interests (Shleifer & Summers, 1988; Stout, 
2012). Previous empirical research also suggests that labor rents are transferred to shareholders 
after hedge fund activism. Specifically, hedge fund activism resulted in implicit wage reduction 
because the employees of the target firms experienced stagnation in wages and work hours despite 
an 8.4% increase in labor productivity during the three-year period after the intervention (Brav, 
Jiang, & Kim, 2015). 
 Second, hedge fund campaigns may undermine work culture. Even if some employees are 
not directly affected by layoffs and reductions in their benefit package, they may be affected by 
the hostility and short-termism that the hedge fund activists bring into the workplace, sometimes 
via the management, which is controlled by hedge fund activists. Employees may suffer from job 
insecurity, instability, and low morale, all of which can cause work stress. Employees can also lose 
their trust in their leaders if the leaders prioritize the interests of hedge fund activists and 
shareholders over those of employees, which can decrease employee satisfaction. Employees may 
become less loyal to their companies after trust is breached by management (Shleifer & Summers, 
1988).      
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 For example, Marcato Capital Management, an activist hedge fund, acquired 5.1% of 
Buffalo Wild Wings (BWW) shares in July 2016 and reported to the SEC that it aimed to enhance 
shareholder value of the company. Richard McGuire of Marcato demanded that BWW increase its 
franchise ratio from 49% to 90% by selling stores to franchisees to improve return and allow faster 
growth. After a bitter proxy battle, Marcato won three of the four board seats it was seeking and 
pushed out Sally Smith, the CEO of the company, in June 2017. Five months later, in November 
2017, Roark Capital, a private equity firm, announced that it would acquire BWW. During the 
campaign, many employees complained about instability and discontent with their leadership on 
the company review website Glassdoor: “Very unstable time in the company right now. Not a lot 
of room for growth.” “Bad upper management and constant management turnover.” “Management 
sometime takes the customer[’]s side over the employee which in certain situations can be 
undermining.” “Changes in leadership give more focus on profit then people.” As these 
representative quotations show, hedge fund activism campaigns can harm the target company’s 
work culture by reducing employees’ sense of job security and trust in leadership. In sum, hedge 
fund activism can negatively affect employee satisfaction through campaigns that often reduce 
employees’ welfare and harm the company’s work culture. 
  
Hypothesis 1-1: Corporate ownership by activist hedge funds reduces employee satisfaction in the 
target company. 
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2. Passive index funds’ engagement and employee satisfaction 
In contrast to hedge fund activism, an index fund’s engagement with its portfolio company 
can positively affect its employees by helping the managers take a long-term perspective on the 
company’s value. Index fund managers can directly tackle their companies’ operational issues, or 
they can address other social, environmental, or governance concerns to increase the long-term 
value of their companies. Regarding operational issues, unlike short-term speculators, index fund 
managers can be patient about their firms’ investments in workforce and R&D that may impose a 
short-term financial burden but yield a much higher value in the long run. For example, with a 
firm’s long-term value in mind, employers can choose to raise employees’ wages to attract more 
talented workers. Employers can also choose not to lay off their workers during a recession to 
maintain employee loyalty, which can lead the employees to provide better customer service. 
Employers can choose to invest their resources in their employees’ training, which can increase 
employees’ skill set and motivation to put forth more effort, which in turn helps the company 
achieve better performance in the long run. Previous research finds that ownership by dedicated 
owners with a long-term investment horizon decreases pay dispersion (measured as the average 
TMT compensation divided by the average employee compensation), which is a risky practice that 
is positively associated with short-term firm performance but negatively associated with long-term 
firm performance (Connelly, Haynes, Tihanyi, Gamache, & Devers, 2016). Institutional investors 
are also patient with firms’ investment in R&D, which generates value in the long run. Ownership 
by institutional investors is positively associated with R&D investment (Hansen & Hill, 1991), 
and ownership by family members with a long-term investment horizon positively moderates an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between financial slack and R&D investment (Kim, Kim, & Lee, 
2008), both of which improve the long-term performance of the firm. Also, previous research finds 
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that under the protection of informed institutional investors who can reduce managers’ career risks, 
managers can reduce myopic R&D investment and support more valuable innovation (Aghion, 
Van Reenen, & Zingales, 2013; Bushee, 1998), which can positively affect their inventors’ and 
researchers’ motivation and job satisfaction.  
Second, index fund managers can engage with their firms regarding social, environmental, 
or governance concerns that are not directly related to core operational issues but can ensure 
sustainable growth of their firms. Blackrock, Vanguard, and State Street, the three largest 
institutional investors in the United States, clearly acknowledge that environmental, social, and 
governance risks and opportunities can affect companies’ long-term financial returns. Therefore, 
index fund managers may intervene if their portfolio company’s business harms some of their 
stakeholders, such as customers, the environment, and the communities in which they operate, 
which may impede its future growth. For example, after the mass shooting tragedy at a Florida 
high school in February 2018, Blackrock engaged with major publicly traded civilian firearms 
manufacturers and retailers to address the community’s concerns about gun safety (Blackrock, 
2018). Discussion topics included the steps gun makers take to support the safe and responsible 
use of their products, the strategies and processes they employ to monitor how their products are 
being sold, and investment in R&D to promote the safety of the products. With retailers, Blackrock 
discussed topics including retailers’ policies and practices for determining to whom they will sell 
firearms and strategies to prevent the potential misuse of the firearms they sell. In sum, Blackrock, 
as a long-term shareholder of gun makers and retailers, actively engaged with  companies to 
address the community’s concerns about the societal impact of their businesses, thereby driving 
changes to ensure the sustainable growth of their firms.  
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Employees who work for companies that have long-term growth strategies may have 
higher satisfaction than employees who work for companies that have a short-sighted business 
plan. When a company maintains a long-term perspective for its development, its business is more 
likely to be sustainable. A company’s long-term prosperity can give its employees opportunities 
to grow and be promoted within the firm, and employees are less likely to worry about losing their 
jobs or having to move to other companies, which devalues their idiosyncratic skills. Also, an 
employer’s strong reputation for future growth can increase motivation, trust in the leadership, and 
organizational identification. Purposeful organization research also shows that having an 
organizational purpose that goes beyond profit maximization increases the meaningfulness of work 
at the employee level (Pratt & Ashforth, 2003). In sum, I predict that a high concentration of index 
fund ownership positively affects employee satisfaction by helping a firm to create long-term value 
that is aligned with its employees’ interests.  
 
Hypothesis 1-2: Proportion of shares owned by Big3 index funds increases employee satisfaction.  
 
Mediating role of firms’ attention to their human capital  
Human capital - employees' knowledge, skills, and abilities that are used to achieve the 
firm’s goals - is an important resource for companies (Becker, 1962). Human capital is firms’ 
strategic asset and a source of sustained competitive advantage (Coff, 1997) that relates strongly 
to firm performance (Crook, Todd, Combs, Woehr, & Ketchen Jr, 2011). As innovation and 
creativity become more critical in today’s competitive business environment, companies become 
more dependent on key talents who possess valuable knowledge and skills.   
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Yet, managing human capital imposes challenges to managers due to the unique nature of 
human capital. Unlike physical capital such as buildings and machinery, human capital is 
embodied in employees, and thus puts the firms under the threat of employee turnover and moral 
hazard (Coff, 1997). For example, an empirical research found that the departure of skilled 
scientists in private firms after the firms went public led to 40% decline in innovative activity as 
measured by patent citations (Bernstein, 2015).  
Then, what kinds of human capital management practices do research recommend for 
companies when managing their employees? As one of many human capital management practices 
that are interconnected, employee training has been the focus of many studies. Even when 
considered as a stand-alone policy unconnected to other human capital management practices, 
employee training is frequently associated with higher firm profits (Bernstein & Beeferman, 2015).  
Research on high performance work systems (HPWS) suggests that a comprehensive 
approach is needed to achieve positive firm performance outcomes. HPWS is a group of separate 
but interconnected human resource management practices designed to enhance employees' skills 
and effort. Examples of high HPWS are as follow: extensive recruitment and selection procedures, 
training programs that develop firm-specific skills and knowledge, formal information sharing, 
attitude assessment, grievance procedures, labor-management participation programs, objective 
performance appraisals with developmental feedback, and compensations that recognize and 
reward employee merit. Research shows that HPWS has an economically and statistically 
significant impact on both employee outcomes (reduced employee turnover and enhanced 
productivity) and organizational outcomes (short- and long-term measures of financial 
performance) (Huselid, 1995). Researchers indicate that HPWS increases firm performance by 
developing employees' knowledge and skills (Takeuchi, Lepak, Wang, & Takeuchi, 2007), 
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enhancing employees' motivation and commitment (Messersmith, Patel, Lepak, & Gould-
Williams, 2011), and strengthening relationships among employees (Gittell, Seidner, & Wimbush, 
2010).  
 
Hypotheses 
Firms’ attention to their human capital management practices is likely to increase employee 
satisfaction. Human capital management practices include recruitment and selection, training and 
development, compensation, career growth, job design and responsibilities, and work environment. 
As mangers increase their attention to each human capital management practice of their firms, 
managers gain more knowledge and information on how to develop employees’ knowledge and 
skills, increase employees’ motivation and commitment, and strengthen the relationships among 
employees. Based on this knowledge and information, managers can better create High 
Performance Work Systems (HPWS) that are comprised of policies and practices that are uniquely 
designed for the workers in the firms. Therefore, I hypothesize that firms’ attention to their HR 
practices will increase employee satisfaction.   
 
Hypothesis 2: Firms’ attention to their human capital management practices increases employee 
satisfaction.  
 
Shareholders and employees are both critical stakeholders of firms who contribute vital 
resources for firms’ operations. Shareholders invest their financial capital while employees 
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contribute their human capital. In the short term, shareholders and employees compete for limited 
resources, such as firms’ financial profit. Finance research on the effect of activist hedge funds on 
employee wages shows that the productivity gains from activist campaigns are distributed 
unequally, in favor of activist hedge funds over employees (Brav, Jiang, & Kim, 2015). Another 
finance research reveals that shareholders demand higher risk premia to invest in firms with high 
levels of organization capital — intangible capital that is embodied in the firm’s key talent and is 
partly firm specific (Lev & Radhakrishnan, 2005) — relative to firms with more physical capital 
(Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou, 2013). More specifically, the study finds that firms with more 
organizational capital have 4.6% higher average returns than firms with less organizational capital. 
The researchers suggest that because the efficiency of organization capital is partly firm specific 
and it is embodied in the firm's key talent, both shareholders and key talents have a claim on the 
cash flows from organization capital. Therefore, investors demand higher risk premia to invest in 
firms where employees have potentially higher power to claim their shares of the cash flows.  
Managerial attention is another limited resource that shareholders and employees compete 
for. As activist hedge funds gain corporate ownership, the managers of the target firms will 
increase their attention to shareholders. As activist hedge funds demand target firms’ managers to 
primarily serve shareholders and to increase shareholder value, employees will lose their priority 
in the firm as a critical stakeholder group. As a result of hedge fund activism, managers are likely 
to decrease their attention to employees and redirect their limited attention to shareholders who 
impose an imminent threat to the management. Therefore, I hypothesize that activist hedge funds’ 
ownership will reduce managers’ attention to their human capital while increasing managers’ 
attention to their shareholders.  
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Hypothesis 3-1: Corporate ownership by activist hedge funds reduces firms’ attention to their 
human capital.  
 
 On the other hand, index investors are likely to increase the invested firms’ attention to 
their human capital. Index investors are interested in firms’ long-term growth as they expect to 
own companies’ stocks for decades. Index investors emphasize the importance of human capital 
and their development because human capital management is vital for firms’ long-term success. 
For example, Larry Fink, the CEO of Blackrock, highlighted the importance of investing in 
employee training and development for firms’ sustainable growth in his annual letter to CEOs of 
its portfolio firms. Blackrock identified human capital management as one of their engagement 
priorities. Vanguard also clearly states in its voting guideline that it will “generally vote for 
proposals requiring the  inclusion of sexual orientation, gender identity, minority status, or 
protected classes in a company’s employment and diversity policies when the company does not 
already have such protections.” Similarly, State Street states in its proxy voting guidelines that 
companies need to align corporate culture with long-term strategy. State Street recommends 
firms to identify indicators that reflect desired culture, such as employee turnover, retention 
rates, employee satisfaction survey results, and pay differences among their employees, and tie 
these indicators to incentives. Thus, I hypothesize that corporate ownership by large index funds 
increases firms’ attention to their human capital. 
 
Hypothesis 3-2: Proportion of shares owned by Big3 index funds increases firms’ attention to their 
human capital. 
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Employee satisfaction and firms’ financial performance 
 
Management and finance researchers have long been interested in finding out the 
relationship between employee satisfaction and firm performance. While the literature is plentiful 
regarding how an individual’s job satisfaction relates to their individual performance, fewer studies 
have been done on how firm-level employee satisfaction relates to firm-level performance. I 
specifically focus on the relationship between the average employee satisfaction with the firm and 
firm-level financial performance. Do happy employees increase firm performance or does high 
firm performance make employees happy? Are they just correlated without any direct causal 
relationship or are they not correlated at all?  
Many previous studies found a positive correlation between employee satisfaction and firm 
performance. For example, firms’ Tobin’s q, calculated as total market value divided by total asset 
value, is significantly correlated with overall employee satisfaction (Luo et al., 2016). Similarly, 
firms’ Tobin’s q and ROS are higher when employees perceive their top managers as trustworthy 
and ethical (Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2015). Several studies found a causal relationship 
between the two, showing that employee satisfaction increases firm performance. For example, 
firms that were rated by their employees to exhibit both high purpose and clarity generated higher 
ROA, Tobin's q, and abnormal return (Gartenberg, Prat, & Serafeim, 2019). Another study found 
that high levels of employee satisfaction generate more positive earnings surprises and long-run 
stock returns because the stock market does not fully incorporate the value of intangibles (Edmans 
(2011). Yet, some researchers found that the causal relationship between employee satisfaction 
and firm performance varies depending on the type of employee satisfaction. For example, 
researchers found that an overall job satisfaction and satisfaction with security are not the cause of 
high firm performance, but rather the consequence of high firm performance (Schneider, Hanges, 
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Smith, & Salvaggio, 2003). In other words, firm performance measured as ROA and EPS predicted 
employees’ overall job satisfaction and satisfaction with security. The same study also found that 
the causal relationship between satisfaction with pay and firm performance is reciprocal - 
satisfaction with pay predicts higher ROA and EPS and vice versa.  
Employee satisfaction can have a positive effect on firms’ financial performance through 
two main mechanisms. First, employees with high satisfaction are motivated to put forth higher 
effort for the successful growth of their organizations. Motivated employees are more productive 
than their unmotivated colleagues and are more likely to engage in organizational citizenship 
behavior that increases the efficient functioning of their organizations. Second, firms with high 
employee satisfaction are more likely to recruit and retain talent and thereby sustain a high quality 
of human capital. If skilled employees who are not satisfied with their employers decide to exit, 
the firm will experience a decline in its performance. An empirical study finds that private firms 
experienced an exodus of skilled inventors as they went public, and as a result, firms’ innovation 
novelty measured by patent citations declined by 40% (Bernstein, 2015). Losing their key talent 
also puts firms at risk of being outcompeted by their rivals who recruit their former talent. In sum, 
I predict that employee satisfaction increases firms’ future financial performance. The summary 
of all the hypotheses can be found in Figure Ⅳ.1. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Employee satisfaction will increase firms’ financial performance.  
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Figure Ⅳ.1. Summary of hypotheses 
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CHAPTER Ⅴ 
 
Methods  
 
 
My sample contains all publicly traded US companies from 2008 to early 2018. In order to 
increase the validity of employee satisfaction measure, I only use observations that have at least 
10 employee reviews per firm-year. For robustness check, I use 20 employee reviews as a threshold.  
 
Variables 
Employee satisfaction 
In order to develop the employee satisfaction variable, I use employees’ 5-star overall 
ratings of their employers. I average all the ratings for each firm-year from 2008 to 2018 to focus 
on the trends. Glassdoor reviews have information about the date the review was posted and an 
overall 5-star rating of the company. Because former employees of the companies could also leave 
reviews of their companies after they left their jobs, I coded the year variable for former employees 
using the year when former employees left their companies.  
Using online review data may have a limitation that needs to be addressed. The employee 
reviews on the website may not represent the sentiment of the majority of employees. It is possible 
that only the most vocal employees post reviews, and therefore the reviews may be biased towards 
the extreme ends of negativity or positivity. In other words, selection bias may exist in the data 
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because Glassdoor does not randomly select employees to leave their reviews on the website. In 
order to mitigate a possible selection bias, Glassdoor adopted “Give to Get (GTG)” policy from 
the inception of its service. GTG allows a user to submit her own company’s review only after 
viewing three pieces of content and gaining unlimited access to the site’s content (Glassdoor, 2018). 
A study shows that Glassdoor’s GTG reduces both extremely negative and positive star ratings 
(Marinescu, Klein, Chamberlain, & Smart, 2018). More specifically, GTG reduces the likelihood 
of extreme 1-star and 5-star reviews by 3.6% points and 2.1% points, respectively, and it raises the 
likelihood of more moderate 3-star and 4-star reviews by 2.6% points and 2.9% points, respectively 
(Glassdoor, 2017). Previous research also found that Glassdoor overall satisfaction ratings 
moderately correlate with traditional employee surveys (i.e. Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey) 
(r = 0.516, p = 0.007), supporting the validity of the Glassdoor rating as a measure of overall 
employee satisfaction at the organizational level (Landers et al., 2019). For the analysis, I averaged 
all employee ratings for each company-year, and controlled for the total number of Glassdoor 
reviews for each company-year. 
The Glassdoor data set includes 1,380,734 employee ratings of their employers. When 
ratings are aggregated to a firm-year level, the number of employee ratings by year ranges from 
1 to 6,123. Because an extremely small number of employee ratings can negatively affect the 
validity of the measure, I eliminated observations that had less than 10 employee ratings per 
year. Therefore, the final data set includes 1,651 firms (7,739 firm-year observations) based on 
1,127,674 employee ratings.  
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Hedge fund ownership 
Hedge fund ownership data are collected from the original Schedule 13D and Schedule 
13D/A filings by activist hedge funds. Investors are required to submit 13D filings to the SEC 
within 10 days after acquiring more than 5% of any class of publicly traded securities with the 
intent to influence the firm’s management. A filer must report its level of ownership (%) and the 
purpose of the transaction. Since there is no regulatory definition of an activist hedge fund, I use 
the list of top 100 activist shareholders from the Thomson Reuters corporate governance 
database to code a block holder’s classification.  
Hedge fund ownership is a dummy variable. I code a target firm-year observation as 1 if 
any one of the 100 activist hedge funds filed a 13D or 13D/A in a given year, reporting its level 
of ownership in the target firm and the purpose of the transaction. In total, 260 firm-year 
observations in the final sample were coded as undergoing hedge fund activism initiated by any 
one of the 100 activist hedge funds between 2008 and 2017. 
Because Gamco Investors, Inc. is the most active hedge fund that accounts for almost one 
third of the occurrences, I created two additional dummy variables for Gamco Investors, Inc. and 
for all other 99 activist hedge funds. The two additional dummy variables are analyzed 
separately from the hedge fund ownership dummy variable. 
 
Index funds ownership 
Index fund ownership data are from the Thomson Reuters institutional holdings (13F) 
database. Until around 2018, Thomson Reuters’ 13F data had a reliability issue. For example, 
Blackrock’s holdings were underreported from 2013 (Anderson & Brockman, 2016; Ben-David, 
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Franzoni, Moussawi, & Sedunov, 2016). Thomson Reuters fixed this data problem as of 2019. 
Also, in order to capture the yearly trend of the ownership, I averaged the ownership data for all 
four quarters instead of using the ownership data from the end of the fourth quarter. Institutional 
ownership is a continuous variable, and it is the yearly average of the sum of the ownership by the 
three largest index investors: Vanguard, Blackrock, and State Street.  
 
Firms’ attention to human capital management 
Human capital management data came from the Risk Factors section of Form 10-K. Form 
10-K is an annual report that provides comprehensive information about the company’s business 
and financial condition. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires companies with 
more than $10 million in assets and 2,000 common shareholders to file Form 10-K so that investors 
can make informed investment decisions. One of the sections required in Form 10-K is Risk Factor 
section where companies list significant risks that apply to their business or to their securities, 
generally in order of their importance. Risk factors may apply to the whole economy, to the 
company’s industry, or geographic region, or can be unique to the company.   
Firms’ attention to human capital management practices data are from the original 10-K 
documents filed by each firm. In order to operationalize the variable, I conducted a text analysis 
of the risk factors section of the 10-K filings. In the risk factor section, firms list current and 
anticipated risks that can affect their businesses in the future, such as increasing industry 
competition and state regulation. By analyzing whether and how much firms address human capital 
management practices in their risk factor section, I can measure the level of firms’ attention to 
their human capital management practices compared to other risk factors. More specifically, I 
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extracted all the sentences in the risk factors section that are related to employees by examining 
whether each sentence contains at least one of the following key words: [“employee”, “worker”, 
“workforce”, “personnel”, “staff”, “labor ”, “labors”, “talent”, “associates”, “unionized”, “team 
member”, “recruits”, “sales representatives”, “independent contractor”]. The total number of 
employee-related words was used to create the firms’ attention to human capital variable. Then, I 
counted the number of times any words related to knowledge, skills, and abilities (KS&A) were 
mentioned in the extracted employee-related sentences for each firm-year observation. Words 
related to KS&A are as follow: [' knowledge', ' skill', ' abilit', ' talent', ' compenten', ' expert', ' 
creativ']. In addition to creating firms’ attention to KS&A, I created variables for firms’ attention 
to employee motivation, resource-based view of employees, and cost-based view of employees. 
Dictionaries can be found in Table Ⅲ.3. I counted the total number of sentences in the risk factors 
section to control for the length of the risk factors for each firm-year observation.     
 
Firm performance 
I measure firm’s financial performance as Return on Asset (ROA). Control variables 
include size measured by the number of total employees, market value measured as the total 
number of outstanding shares multiplied by a share price and industry, all of which are collected 
from Compustat. Firms’ S&P index is collected from Siblis research and included as a control 
variable. Also, variance of overall employee ratings for each company-year observation is 
calculated and included as a control variable.  Table Ⅴ.1 lists all the variables, how the variables 
are operationalized, and data sources.  
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For analysis, I used a random effect panel regression model. A random effect model 
estimates the effects of time-invariant variables, such as S&P market index, industry, and firms’ 
attention to human capital. All independent variables and control variables were lagged by one 
year.  
Table Ⅴ.1. Description of variables 
 
Variables Operationalization Source 
Employee satisfaction Overall rating of a company by past and 
current employees  
(5-star rating) 
Glassdoor.com  
Hedge fund ownership  1 = Top 100 activist hedge funds filed 
13D  
0 = otherwise 
-13D filings 
-Thomson Reuters 
corporate governance 
database and FactSet 
SharkWatch database 
Hedge fund ownership by 
Gamco Investors, Inc. 
 
Hedge fund activism by 99 
activist hedge funds other 
than Gamco Investors, Inc. 
1 = Gamco Investors, Inc. filed 13D  
0 = otherwise 
 
1 = Top 99 activist hedge funds other 
than Gamco Investors, Inc. filed 13D  
0 = otherwise 
-13D filings 
-Thomson Reuters 
corporate governance 
database and FactSet 
SharkWatch database 
Index funds’ ownership Collective ownership % by Blackrock, 
Vanguard, and State Street 
Thomson Reuters 
institutional holdings (13F) 
database 
Firms’ attention to human 
capital management 
practices 
Total number of words that are related 
to human capital management practices 
in employee-related sentences in the 
risk factors section in each firm’s 10-K 
10-K filings 
 
S&P index 
Dummy variable  
S&P 500, S&P 400, S&P 600, 
Non-S&P 1500 
 
Siblis Research 
Financial performance  ROA   
 
Compustat 
Market value Share price x total number of 
outstanding (log) 
Industry Dummy variables 
Year Dummy variable 
Size Number of employees 
Number of employee 
reviews 
Total number of employee reviews for 
each company-year 
 
Glassdoor.com 
Variance of employee 
ratings 
Variance of employee ratings for each 
company-year 
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CHAPTER Ⅵ 
 
Results, Robustness Checks 
 
 
In this chapter, I share the results of the analyses and robustness checks. In the next 
chapter, I conduct more exploratory analyses and discuss several important findings.  
Table Ⅵ.1 presents the pairwise correlations among variables included in the analyses. 
Gamco Investors’ and other activist hedge funds’ ownership are negatively and significantly 
correlated with overall satisfaction (r= -0.07 and r= -0.02 respectively). Also, Big3 index funds’ 
ownership is positively and significantly correlated with employees’ overall satisfaction (r= 
0.16).   
Table Ⅵ.2 presents the results of the panel regression analyses of H1-1 and H1-2. Model 
1 only includes control variables. Firms with high ROA (β = 0.08, p < 0.01) and market value (β 
= 0.07, p < 0.01) show high employee satisfaction. On the other hand, the higher the number of 
employees in the firm, the lower the employee satisfaction (β = -0.34, p < 0.05).   
H1-1 predicts that hedge fund ownership reduces employee satisfaction in the target 
company. The results of Model 2 show that the effect of hedge fund ownership on employee 
satisfaction is not statistically significant. However, the results of Model 3 show a negative 
coefficient on the Gamco Investors’ ownership variable, and the coefficient is statistically 
significant in 0.05 level (β = -0.11, p < 0.01). In other words, employee satisfaction is 0.11 point 
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lower when the firm is owned by Gamco Investors compared to when the firm is not owned by 
the hedge fund. On the other hand, the results of Model 4 show that the effect of corporate 
ownership by all the other 99 activist hedge funds (other than Gamco Investors) on employee 
satisfaction is not statistically significant. The results of Models 2, 3, and 4 suggest that activist 
hedge funds may have different campaign strategies and/or goals, which affects employee 
satisfaction differently. Thus, H1-1 is partially supported. 
Model 5 tests H1-2 which predicts that a company’s index fund ownership increases 
employee satisfaction. The results of Model 5 show that the ownership by the three largest index 
funds does not increase employee satisfaction. Therefore, H1-2 is not supported. Model 6 
includes all variables, and the results stay similar.   
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Table Ⅵ.1. Pairwise correlations 
 
 Variables Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)  
  (1) overall rating 3.19 0.50  
  (2) Gamco 0.01 0.11 -0.07*  
  (3) non-Gamco 0.03 0.17 -0.02* -0.02*  
  (4) big3 ownership (10%) 1.43 0.66 0.16* -0.01 -0.05*  
  (5) ROA 0.35 0.27 -0.04* 0.00 0.01 -0.12*  
  (6) market value (log) 8.11 1.75 0.34* -0.07* -0.05* 0.31* -0.22*  
  (7) employees (million) 0.03 0.09 0.03* -0.02* -0.02 -0.00 0.04* 0.32*  
  (8) # employee words  0.06 0.04 -0.04* -0.02* -0.01 -0.07* 0.24* -0.17* 0.18*  
  (9) # profit words  0.03 0.03 -0.05* 0.00 0.03* 0.00 0.11* -0.05* 0.02* 0.17*  
  (10) # shareholder words 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.06* -0.02* -0.07* 0.00 0.02 -0.06* 0.01  
  (11) # stock price words  0.01 0.01 -0.03* -0.04* 0.01 -0.10* 0.17* -0.19* -0.08* 0.10* -0.03* 0.01  
  (12) # recruit words  0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.04* 0.00 -0.11* 0.25* -0.15* 0.08* 0.56* 0.10* -0.04* 0.20*  
  (13) # benefit words  0.00 0.01 -0.04* 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.11* 0.32* 0.11* -0.04* -0.08* 0.03*  
   
  * shows significance at the .05 level  
# words related to each theme (from (8) to (13)) are total number of words related to each theme divided by the total number of sentences in the 
risk factors section  
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Table Ⅵ.2. Results of panel regression of employee satisfaction on hedge fund ownership and index fund ownership  
(minimum 10 GD reviews) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DV: Employee satisfaction Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Activist HF ownership (dummy)  -0.02     
  (0.02)     
Activist HF: Gamco (dummy)   -0.11***   -0.11*** 
   (0.04)   (0.04) 
Activist HF: Non-Gamco (dummy)    0.02  0.02 
    (0.02)  (0.02) 
Big3 Index funds ownership (in 10%)     0.00 0.00 
     (0.01) (0.01) 
ROA 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Market value (logged) 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
#of employees (in millions) -0.34** -0.34** -0.34** -0.34** -0.34** -0.34** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
S&P 400 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
S&P 500 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
S&P 600 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Variance of GD ratings (firm-year) -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
# of GD reviews (firm-year) Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 2.61*** 2.62*** 2.62*** 2.61*** 2.60*** 2.61*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
 92 
 
       
Observations 9,516 9,516 9,516 9,516 9,346 9,346 
Number of cid 1,966 1,966 1,966 1,966 1,926 1,926 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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For robustness check, I analyzed observations with at least 20 Glassdoor reviews per 
firm-year. As shown in Table Ⅵ.3, the results are similar. Moreover, I examined which specific 
dimensions of employee satisfaction are negatively affected by Gamco Investors’ ownership. 
The results in Table Ⅵ.4 show that Gamco Investors’ ownership negatively affects employees’ 
satisfaction with the firm’s culture (β = -0.15, p < 0.01), their career opportunity (β = -0.11, p < 
0.01), compensation/benefits (β = -0.08, p < 0.05), and senior leadership (β = -0.01, p < 0.1) in 
the order of significance.  
Additionally, I checked whether a reverse causality exists such that firms with low 
employee satisfaction are more likely to be targeted by Gamco Investors. The results of Model 2 
in Table Ⅵ.5 show that there is a reverse causality, such that firms with higher employee 
satisfaction are less likely to be targeted by Gamco Investors (β = -0.01, p < 0.01). Finally, as 
shown in Model 4 in Table Ⅵ.5, when SharkWatch data set is used to code activist hedge funds 
instead of Thomson Reuters (TR) data set, the results stayed similar.  
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Table Ⅵ.3. Results of panel regression of employee satisfaction on hedge fund ownership and index fund ownership  
(minimum 20 GD reviews) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DV: Employee satisfaction Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Activist HF ownership (dummy)  -0.02     
  (0.02)     
Activist HF: Gamco (dummy)   -0.12**   -0.11** 
   (0.05)   (0.05) 
Activist HF: Non-Gamco (dummy)    0.01  0.01 
    (0.02)  (0.02) 
Big3 Index funds ownership (in 10%)     0.00 0.00 
     (0.01) (0.01) 
ROA 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Market value (logged) 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
#of employees (in millions) -0.32*** -0.32*** -0.32*** -0.32*** -0.32** -0.32** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) 
S&P 400 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
S&P 500 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 0.02 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
S&P 600 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Variance of GD ratings (firm-year) -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.23*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
# of GD reviews (firm-year) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 2.70*** 2.70*** 2.71*** 2.70*** 2.69*** 2.70*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
 95 
 
       
Observations 6,776 6,776 6,776 6,776 6,652 6,652 
Number of cid 1,519 1,519 1,519 1,519 1,491 1,491 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Table Ⅵ.4. Results of panel regression of individual dimension of employee satisfaction on 
hedge fund ownership and index fund ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Employee satisfaction Career 
opportunity 
Compensation 
/Benefits 
Culture Senior 
leadership 
Work-life 
balance 
      
Activist HF: Gamco (dummy) -0.11*** -0.08** -0.15*** -0.08* -0.04 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
Activist HF: Non-Gamco (dummy) -0.02 0.05** -0.02 -0.01 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Big3 Index funds ownership  -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.00 0.01 
(in 10%) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ROA 0.09*** -0.03 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Market value (logged) 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.02*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
#of employees (in millions) -0.22 -0.45*** -0.40** -0.40*** -0.34** 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.17) (0.15) (0.14) 
S&P 400 -0.02 0.05** -0.01 -0.00 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
S&P 500 0.00 0.08*** 0.01 -0.01 0.05** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
S&P 600 -0.04* -0.00 -0.06** -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
# of GD reviews (firm-year) 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 2.17*** 2.61*** 2.44*** 2.14*** 3.16*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) 
      
Observations 9,346 9,346 9,284 9,346 9,346 
Number of cid 1,926 1,926 1,926 1,926 1,926 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table Ⅵ.5. Test of reverse causality – The results of panel regression of shareholder ownership on employee satisfaction   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Activist HF 
ownership 
(TR) 
Gamco 
ownership 
Non-Gamco 
ownership 
(TR) 
Activist HF 
ownership 
(SharkWatch: 
includes Gamco) 
Big3 
ownership 
      
Employee satisfaction -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
ROA -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.04 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Market value (logged) -0.01*** -0.00 -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.09*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
#of employees (in millions) -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.47*** 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.14) 
S&P 400 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.59*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
S&P 500 0.02** -0.00 0.02** 0.03** 0.51*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
S&P 600 0.01 0.01* -0.00 0.01 0.71*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 0.17*** 0.06*** 0.09*** 0.15*** -0.51*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) 
      
Observations 8,855 8,855 8,855 8,855 7,590 
Number of cid 1,941 1,941 1,941 1,941 1,800 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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H2 predicts that firms’ attention to their human capital management practices increases 
employee satisfaction. Table Ⅵ.6 presents the results of the panel regression analyses. The 
results of Model 1 show that the number of words related to the knowledge, skill, and abilities of 
employees and their management practices in the risk factors section does not have any effect on 
employee satisfaction. Similarly, the results of Model 4 show that the number of words related to 
employee motivation and its management practices in the risk factors section does not affect 
employee satisfaction. 
 However, when firms’ attention to each of the specific human capital management 
practice was analyzed separately, firms’ attention to employee recruitment, turnover, and 
benefits were found to affect employee satisfaction. The results of Model 2 and 3 shows that the 
number of words related to recruitment in the risk factors section (i.e. ' recruit', ' hire', ' hiring', ' 
attract') increases employee satisfaction (β = 0.01, p < 0.05), while the number of words related 
to turnover (i.e. ' turnover') in the risk factor section reduces employee satisfaction (β = -0.03, p 
< 0.05). Similarly, the results of Model 5 show that the number of words related to benefits (i.e. ' 
benefits', ' pension', ' 401k') reduces employee satisfaction (β = -0.01, p < 0.1). Model 6 includes 
all variables, and the results stay similar.  
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Table Ⅵ.6. Results of panel regression of employee satisfaction on firms’ attention to human capital management practices  
(minimum 10 GD reviews) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DV: Employee satisfaction Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
#KSA-broad words 0.00      
 (0.00)      
#Recruit words  0.01**    0.01*** 
  (0.00)    (0.00) 
#Turnover words   -0.03**   -0.04*** 
   (0.01)   (0.01) 
#Motivation-broad words    -0.00   
    (0.00)   
#Benefits words     -0.01* -0.01** 
     (0.00) (0.00) 
ROA 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Market value (logged) 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
# of employees (in millions) -0.35*** -0.35*** -0.35** -0.35** -0.34** -0.34** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
S&P 400 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
S&P 500 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
S&P 600 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Variance of GD ratings (firm-year) -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
# of GD reviews (firm-year) Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
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Constant 2.65*** 2.64*** 2.66*** 2.66*** 2.66*** 2.64*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
       
Observations 9,414 9,414 9,414 9,414 9,414 9,414 
Number of cid 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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For robustness check, I ran panel regressions using observations with at least 20 
Glassdoor reviews per firm-year. As shown in Table Ⅵ.7, the results were largely similar. 
However, as can be seen in the results of Model 5, the negative effect of the words related to 
benefits on employee satisfaction is no longer significant.  
In addition, I tested for the possible reverse causality. As shown in Model 1 in Ⅵ.8, past 
year’s employee satisfaction does not have any effect on firms’ attention to recruitment in the 
current year. However, the results of Model 2 show that the higher the employee satisfaction, the 
less likely it is that the firms are concerned about employee turnover.  
Finally, I tested which dimensions of employee satisfaction are affected as a result of 
firms’ attention to employee recruitment and turnover. The results in Table Ⅵ.9 show that firms’ 
attention to recruitment in the risk factors section does increase all four dimensions of employee 
satisfaction, except for compensation/benefits. Firms’ attention to turnover in the risk factors 
section reduces all five dimensions of employee satisfaction.   
In sum, the results show that employee satisfaction can be increased or decreased 
depending on the types of human capital management practices that their firms attend to. For 
example, firms’ attention to employee recruitment increases employee satisfaction, while firms’ 
attention to employee turnover reduces employee satisfaction. Therefore, hypothesis H3-1 is 
partially supported.    
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Table Ⅵ.7. Results of panel regression of employee satisfaction on firms’ attention to human capital management practices  
(minimum 20 GD reviews) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DV: Employee satisfaction Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
#KSA-broad words 0.00      
 (0.00)      
#Recruit words  0.01***    0.01*** 
  (0.00)    (0.00) 
#Turnover words   -0.03**   -0.04*** 
   (0.01)   (0.01) 
#Motivation-broad words    -0.00   
    (0.00)   
#Benefits words     -0.00 -0.01** 
     (0.00) (0.00) 
ROA 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.08*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Market value (logged) 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
# of employees (in millions) -0.30** -0.30** -0.30** -0.29** -0.29** -0.34** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) 
S&P 400 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
S&P 500 0.05** 0.05** 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
S&P 600 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04* -0.04* -0.04* -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Variance of GD ratings (firm-year) -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.16*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
# of GD reviews (firm-year) Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
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Constant 2.73*** 2.71*** 2.74*** 2.74*** 2.74*** 2.64*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
       
Observations 6,701 6,701 6,701 6,701 6,701 9,414 
Number of cid 1,521 1,521 1,521 1,521 1,521 1,980 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table Ⅵ.8. Test of reverse causality – The results of panel regression of firms’ attention to 
human capital management practices on employee satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) 
DV: #words in employee-related 
sentences in RF section (10-K) 
#Recruit #Turnover #Benefits 
    
Employee satisfaction -0.06 -0.04*** -0.07** 
 (0.06) (0.01) (0.04) 
ROA 0.37** 0.12*** -0.13 
 (0.18) (0.04) (0.11) 
Market value (logged) -0.08** -0.00 -0.02 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) 
# of employees (in millions) 0.14 -0.29** 1.11*** 
 (0.75) (0.14) (0.42) 
S&P 400 -0.42*** -0.02 -0.11 
 (0.12) (0.02) (0.07) 
S&P 500 -0.40*** -0.04* -0.19*** 
 (0.12) (0.02) (0.07) 
S&P 600 -0.24* 0.01 -0.13* 
 (0.12) (0.02) (0.07) 
# of sentences in RF section 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year dummy Included Included Included 
Industry dummy Included Included Included 
Constant 2.64*** 0.22*** 0.83*** 
 (0.40) (0.08) (0.24) 
    
Observations 6,309 6,309 6,309 
Number of cid 1,494 1,494 1,494 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table Ⅵ.9. Results of panel regression of individual dimension of employee satisfaction on firms’ attention to human capital 
management practices  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Employee satisfaction Career 
opportunity 
Compensation 
/Benefits 
Culture Senior 
leadership 
Work-life 
balance 
      
#Recruit words 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
#Turnover words -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.03** -0.04*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
ROA 0.09*** -0.04 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Market value (logged) 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.02*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
#of employees (in millions) -0.18 -0.42*** -0.45*** -0.41*** -0.38*** 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.17) (0.15) (0.14) 
S&P 400 -0.03 0.03* 0.02 -0.01 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
S&P 500 0.01 0.07*** 0.04 0.00 0.07*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
S&P 600 -0.05** -0.02 -0.02 -0.04* -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
# of GD reviews (firm-year) 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 2.15*** 2.74*** 2.39*** 2.12*** 3.06*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
      
Observations 9,414 9,414 9,403 9,414 9,414 
Number of cid 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table Ⅵ.10 tests H3-1 and H3-2 which predict that ownership by activist hedge funds 
decreases firms’ attention to their human capital management practices while ownership by large 
index funds increases firms’ attention to their human capital management practices. The results 
of Model 1 show that ownership by activist hedge funds does not have a statistically significant 
effect on firms’ attention to the knowledge, skill, and abilities of their employees. On the other 
hand, ownership by large index funds has a negative and statistically significant effect on firms’ 
attention to the knowledge, skill, and abilities of their employees (β = -0.55, p < 0.01). More 
specifically, as large index funds’ collective ownership increases 10%, for example from 5% to 
15%, firms mention 0.55 fewer words related to KS&A in the risk factors section. When each of 
the specific human capital management practice variable related to KS&A was included in the 
analysis, the use of words related to recruitment was driving the effect (β = -0.19, p < 0.01), as 
shown in Model 2. More specifically, as large index funds’ ownership increases 10%, firms use 
0.19 fewer words related to recruitment (i.e. ' recruit', ' hire', ' hiring', ' attract') in the risk factors 
section. Similarly, the results in Model 4 show that ownership by large index funds reduce firms’ 
attention to employee motivation. More specifically, as Big3 index funds ownership increases 
10%, invested firms use 0.18 fewer words related to employee motivation in the risk factors 
section (β = -0.18, p < 0.05).  
 
 
 
 
 
 107 
 
Table Ⅵ.10. Results of panel regression of firms’ attention to each human capital management practice on activist hedge fund and 
big3 index fund ownership (minimum 10 GD reviews) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: #words in employee-related 
sentences in RF section (10-K) 
#KSA 
-broad  
#Recruit #Turn 
over 
#Motivation
-broad 
#Benefits 
      
Activist HF: Gamco (dummy) -0.14 -0.04 0.01 -0.60** -0.22** 
 (0.53) (0.18) (0.03) (0.29) (0.11) 
Activist HF: Non-Gamco (dummy) 0.25 0.13 0.00 -0.13 -0.04 
 (0.29) (0.09) (0.02) (0.16) (0.06) 
Big3 Index funds ownership (in 10%) -0.55*** -0.19*** -0.01 -0.18** 0.01 
 (0.14) (0.05) (0.01) (0.08) (0.03) 
ROA 1.45*** 0.65*** 0.09*** 0.55** -0.01 
 (0.41) (0.14) (0.03) (0.22) (0.08) 
Market value (logged) -0.12 -0.01 -0.02*** -0.07 0.02 
 (0.09) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) 
#of employees (in millions) 2.78 -0.13 -0.11 3.59*** 0.81** 
 (2.08) (0.72) (0.14) (1.15) (0.40) 
S&P 400 -0.25 -0.17* 0.00 -0.18 -0.05 
 (0.30) (0.10) (0.02) (0.16) (0.06) 
S&P 500 -0.63* -0.23** -0.02 -0.10 -0.06 
 (0.33) (0.11) (0.02) (0.18) (0.07) 
S&P 600 -0.19 -0.10 0.03 0.13 -0.01 
 (0.28) (0.10) (0.02) (0.15) (0.06) 
# of sentences in RF section 0.02*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 4.62*** 1.41*** 0.17*** 1.00** 0.05 
 (0.73) (0.25) (0.05) (0.40) (0.14) 
      
Observations 9,295 9,295 9,295 9,295 9,295 
Number of cid 1,922 1,922 1,922 1,922 1,922 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Is this result driven by the possibility that index funds reduce firms’ overall attention to 
employees? In order to understand how index funds ownership affects firms’ general attention to 
employees, I analyzed the effect of index funds ownership on the total number of employee-
related words used in the risk factors section. The results in Table Ⅵ.11 show that index fund 
ownership does not affect the total number of employee-related words used in the risk factors 
section. This finding suggests that index fund ownership specifically reduces firms’ attention to 
employee recruitment and motivation without reducing firms’ overall attention to employees. 
The results in Table Ⅵ.10 and Ⅵ.11 suggest that firms with higher Big3 index fund ownership 
are less likely to be concerned about talent recruitment and maintaining employee motivation, 
possibly because they are already attractive employers for current and potential employees as 
much as they are attractive investments for large index investors. Thus, H3-2 is not supported.  
The results of Model 4 in Table Ⅵ.10 show that ownership by Gamco Investors reduce 
firms’ attention to employee motivation (β = -0.60, p < 0.05). More specifically, when firms are 
owned by Gamco Investors, firms use 0.6 fewer words related to employee motivation in the risk 
factors section. Among multiple practices and policies designed to affect employee motivation, 
Gamco Investors reduces firms’ attention to employee benefits (β = -0.22, p < 0.05). 
Specifically, firms that are under Gamco Investors’ ownership mention 0.22 fewer words related 
to employee benefits (i.e. ' benefits', ' pension', ' 401k') in the risk factors section compared to 
firms that are not under Gamco Investors’ ownership.  
The results in Table Ⅵ.11 show that Gamco Investors’ ownership reduces firms’ overall 
attention to employees. More specifically, firms under Gamco Investors’ ownership use 1.76 
fewer words related to employees compared to firms that are not under Gamco Investors’ 
ownership (β = -1.76, p < 0.01). The results in Table Ⅵ.10 and Table Ⅵ.11  reveal that Gamco 
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Investors reduce invested firms’ attention to their employees, especially issues related to 
employee benefits. Thus, H3-1 is partially supported.  
 
Table Ⅵ.11. Results of panel regression of firms’ attention to employees on activist hedge fund 
and index fund ownership  
 (1) 
DV: #words in RF section (10-K) #Employees 
  
Activist HF: Gamco (dummy) -1.76*** 
 (0.67) 
Activist HF: Non-Gamco (dummy) -0.20 
 (0.36) 
Big3 Index funds ownership  -0.23 
(in 10%) (0.18) 
ROA 2.03*** 
 (0.53) 
Market value (logged) -0.25** 
 (0.11) 
#of employees (in millions) 5.19* 
 (2.75) 
S&P 400 0.55 
 (0.38) 
S&P 500 0.55 
 (0.42) 
S&P 600 1.19*** 
 (0.36) 
# of sentences in RF section 0.04*** 
 (0.00) 
Year dummy Included 
Industry dummy Included 
Constant 4.06*** 
 (0.95) 
  
Observations 9,346 
Number of cid 1,926 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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As shown in Table Ⅵ.12, further analysis shows that when firms have high activist hedge 
funds’ ownership, managers are less likely to consider how employee-related issues can be 
associated with future cost. On the other hand, when firms have high Big3 index funds’ 
ownership, managers are less likely to be concerned about managing their employees as an 
important resource for their firms.  
Table Ⅵ.12. Results of panel regression of firms’ resource-based and cost-based view of 
employees on activist hedge fund and index fund ownership  
 (1) (2) 
DV: #words in RF section (10-K) #Resource 
-broad 
#Cost 
-broad 
   
Activist HF: Gamco (dummy) -0.25 -1.29*** 
 (0.29) (0.28) 
Activist HF: Non-Gamco (dummy) 0.05 -0.36** 
 (0.16) (0.15) 
Big3 Index funds ownership  -0.36*** -0.04 
(in 10%) (0.07) (0.07) 
ROA 0.13 0.56** 
 (0.22) (0.22) 
Market value (logged) -0.03 -0.08* 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
#of employees (in millions) 3.56*** 2.07* 
 (1.09) (1.14) 
S&P 400 0.13 0.05 
 (0.16) (0.16) 
S&P 500 -0.07 0.26 
 (0.18) (0.17) 
S&P 600 0.18 0.10 
 (0.15) (0.15) 
# of sentences in RF section 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Year dummy Included Included 
Industry dummy Included Included 
Constant 1.18*** 2.34*** 
 (0.39) (0.39) 
   
Observations 9,295 9,295 
Number of cid 1,922 1,922 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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H4 predicts that employee satisfaction increases firms’ financial performance. Table 
Ⅵ.13 presents the results of the panel regression analyses. The results of Model 2 show that 
employee satisfaction does not have a significant effect on firms’ financial performance 
measured as return on assets. Thus, hypothesis 4 is not supported.  
 
Table Ⅵ.13. Results of panel regression of firms’ financial performance on employee 
satisfaction 
 (1) (2) 
DV: ROA Model 1 Model 2 
   
Employee satisfaction  -0.00 
  (0.00) 
Market value (logged) -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
# of employees (in millions) 0.08 0.08 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
S&P 400 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
S&P 500 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
S&P 600 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Year dummy Included Included 
Industry dummy Included Included 
Constant 0.45*** 0.45*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
   
Observations 10,151 10,151 
Number of cid 2,146 2,146 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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In order to analyze whether specific dimensions of employee satisfaction may have 
different effect on firm performance, I regressed firm performance on five dimensions of 
employee satisfaction. As shown in Table Ⅵ.14, firm performance is not affected by employees’ 
satisfaction with their career opportunity, culture, senior leadership, or work-life balance. 
However, employees’ satisfaction with their compensation/benefits does negatively and 
significantly affect ROA (β = -0.01, p < 0.01). In other words, when employees are satisfied with 
their compensation/benefits, firms’ ROA in the following year will turn out to be lower. 
Similarly, when employees are dissatisfied with their compensation/benefits, firms’ ROA in the 
following year will turn out to be higher. Figure Ⅵ.1 shows the summary of the findings.  
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Table Ⅵ.14. Results of panel regression of firms’ financial performance on employee satisfaction with individual dimension 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: ROA Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Employees’ satisfaction with      
  Career opportunity 0.00     
 (0.00)     
  Compensation/Benefits  -0.01***    
  (0.00)    
  Culture   0.00   
   (0.00)   
  Senior leadership    -0.00  
    (0.00)  
  Work-life balance     0.00 
     (0.00) 
Market value (logged) -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
# of employees (in millions) 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
S&P 400 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
S&P 500 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
S&P 600 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 0.45*** 0.48*** 0.42*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
      
Observations 10,151 10,151 10,002 10,151 10,151 
Number of cid 2,146 2,146 2,143 2,146 2,146 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure Ⅵ.1. Summary of findings 
 
 
 
 
 
 116 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER Ⅶ 
 
Discussion 
 
 
Shareholders do not directly affect employee satisfaction. (except for Gamco Investors)  
The results of my analyses show that most activist hedge funds do not affect satisfaction 
of the employees at the target firms. However, Gamco Investors, the most active hedge fund in 
terms of the number of activisms, directly and negatively affect target firms’ employee 
satisfaction. More specifically, Gamco Investors’ ownership reduces employees’ satisfaction 
with culture, career opportunity, and compensation/benefits. In addition, firms with low 
employee satisfaction are more likely to be targeted by Gamco Investors, while firms with low 
market value are more likely to be targeted by other activist hedge funds. In sum, these findings 
suggest that it is not any form of activism that reduces employee satisfaction, but employee 
satisfaction depends on who the activist is. Hedge fund activists may have different strategies 
and goals, which may affect employee satisfaction differenty. More research is necessary to 
understand how different types of activist hedge funds and their strategies lead to various effects 
on employee satisfaction at the target firms.  
Also, the results show that ownership by Big3 index funds does not improve employee 
satisfaction at the invested firms. Instead, firms’ market value and ROA have a significant and 
positive effect on employee satisfaction. These findings suggest that big3 index funds’ direct 
engagement with portfolio firms on human capital management issues is limited or their 
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engagement effort did not result in significant enough improvements to affect employees’ 
satisfaction.  
In order to understand how Big3 index funds interact with managers and how their 
governance teams work, I conducted several informal interviews with insiders. A former CEO of 
a large US company said that buy side analysts from Big3 index funds were not different from 
most of other analysts in terms of their short-term orientation, their interest in firms’ financial 
performance (i.e. revenue, expenses, and earnings per share), and lack of interest in human 
capital management. The interviewee also pointed out that it seemed hard for the Big3 index 
funds to translate their long-term orientation with the pressure that they are under, and that 
incentives for the analysts from the Big3 index funds are not aligned with long-term focus. In 
addition, another expert in the investment industry said that Blackrock is also under short-term 
performance pressure because other pension funds would invest through Blackrock, and if they 
find Blackrock’s performance unsatisfactory after 2-3 quarters, they will pull out their money. 
The interviewee also addressed the problem of lack of resources and diffused monitoring – 
because Blackrock and Vanguard only have 25-60 people in their corporate governance team to 
monitor thousands of companies, they rely on proxy advisory services, such as ISS and Glass 
Lewis, to fly an outlier. Moreover, the interviewee added that because the index funds’ client 
base is huge and diverse, it is hard to know what their clients want, which prevents large index 
funds from actively engaging with their portfolio firms about non-financial issues. Both 
interviewees said that Larry Fink really cares about corporate purpose and that they think highly 
of him, however, they pointed out that even Blackrock is not wielding its power strongly enough 
to drive new changes.      
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Still, different shareholders affect managers to attend to different stakeholder groups and 
firm performance indices. 
The results show that ownership by Gamco Investors reduces firms’ attention to 
employee-related issues, especially employee benefits. These findings suggest that shareholders 
affect managers’ perception of risks. When firms are under Gamco Investors’ ownership, 
managers may discount employee-related risks. In other words, managers may pay less attention 
to the firms’ dependency on their employees and treat employee-related risks as insignificant to 
their future businesses.  
The reason why ownership by Big3 index funds reduces firms’ attention to employee 
recruitment in the risk factors section is less clear. A possible explanation is that firms with high 
index fund ownership are already attractive employers for potential employees as much as they 
are attractive investments for index funds. As firms do not perceive talent recruitment as a risk, 
they are less likely to discuss talent recruitment in the risk factors section.     
While my analyses so far focused on shareholders’ effect on managers’ attention to 
human capital management practices, I conducted further analyses to explore whether 
shareholders affect managers’ level of attention to different stakeholders – shareholders, 
employees, and customers – and to different firm performance indices – profit and stock price. 
Table Ⅶ.1 shows the result of the panel regression analyses. Also, Table Ⅶ.2 shows the result 
of the same analysis using SharkWatch data instead of Thomson Reuters’ data for coding activist 
hedge funds. The results of Model 3 in Table Ⅶ.1 and Table Ⅶ.2 show that ownership by 
activist hedge funds increases managerial attention to shareholders (β = 0.45, p < 0.01). These 
findings suggest that activist hedge funds pose an imminent threat to the firms’ management, 
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such that managers perceive the presence of the activists and/or the anticipated changes driven 
by the activists as one of their risk factors.  
In addition, the results of Model 1 in Table Ⅶ.1 and Table Ⅶ.2 show that ownership by 
Big3 index funds reduces managerial attention to stock price (β = -0.18, p < 0.01). This finding 
suggests that because index funds are long-term stockholders, index funds’ ownership allows 
managers to be less concerned about firms’ stock market performance. Although further analysis 
shows that managers’ attention to shareholders and stock price does not affect employee 
satisfaction as shown in Table Ⅶ.3, future research should explore organizational consequences 
of managerial attention to shareholders and stock market performance. In sum, these findings 
show that different types of shareholders cause managers to attend to different stakeholder 
groups and firm performance indices. 
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Table Ⅶ.1. Results of panel regression of firms’ attention to different stakeholder groups and different firm performance indices on 
activist hedge funds and big3 index funds ownership (Thomson Reuters’ database) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: #words in RF section (10-K) #Stock price #Profit #Shareholders #Employees #Customers 
      
Activist HF: Gamco (dummy) -0.18 -0.03 0.50* -1.76*** -0.49 
 (0.19) (0.34) (0.28) (0.67) (1.79) 
Activist HF: Non-Gamco (dummy) 0.21** -0.13 0.69*** -0.20 -0.64 
 (0.10) (0.18) (0.15) (0.36) (0.95) 
Big3 Index funds ownership  -0.18*** -0.12 0.02 -0.23 -0.31 
(in 10%) (0.05) (0.09) (0.07) (0.18) (0.47) 
ROA 0.21 -0.07 0.23 2.03*** 7.54*** 
 (0.15) (0.27) (0.23) (0.53) (1.43) 
Market value (logged) -0.16*** 0.00 -0.04 -0.25** 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.11) (0.30) 
#of employees (in millions) -0.84 -0.13 1.65 5.19* 18.66** 
 (0.78) (1.50) (1.32) (2.75) (7.60) 
S&P 400 -0.09 0.17 -0.60*** 0.55 0.34 
 (0.11) (0.20) (0.16) (0.38) (1.02) 
S&P 500 -0.19 -0.06 -0.90*** 0.55 -0.27 
 (0.12) (0.21) (0.18) (0.42) (1.13) 
S&P 600 -0.08 0.33* -0.52*** 1.19*** 2.53*** 
 (0.10) (0.19) (0.16) (0.36) (0.98) 
# of sentences in RF section 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.04*** 0.09*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 2.09*** 4.04*** 1.57*** 4.06*** -1.40 
 (0.27) (0.50) (0.44) (0.95) (2.59) 
      
Observations 9,346 9,346 9,346 9,346 9,346 
Number of cid 1,926 1,926 1,926 1,926 1,926 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table Ⅶ.2. Results of panel regression of firms’ attention to different stakeholder groups and different firm performance indices on 
activist hedge funds and big3 index funds ownership (SharkWatch database) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: #words in RF section (10-K) #Stock price #Profit #Shareholders #Employees #Customers 
      
Activist HF (SharkWatch) 0.06 -0.37** 0.45*** -0.22 -0.58 
 (0.08) (0.15) (0.12) (0.30) (0.81) 
Big3 Index funds ownership  -0.18*** -0.12 0.02 -0.24 -0.30 
(in 10%) (0.05) (0.09) (0.07) (0.18) (0.47) 
ROA 0.20 -0.09 0.22 2.04*** 7.54*** 
 (0.15) (0.27) (0.23) (0.53) (1.43) 
Market value (logged) -0.16*** 0.00 -0.05 -0.24** 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.11) (0.30) 
#of employees (in millions) -0.82 -0.12 1.69 5.19* 18.63** 
 (0.79) (1.50) (1.32) (2.75) (7.59) 
S&P 400 -0.09 0.17 -0.60*** 0.54 0.34 
 (0.11) (0.19) (0.16) (0.38) (1.02) 
S&P 500 -0.19 -0.06 -0.89*** 0.55 -0.28 
 (0.12) (0.21) (0.18) (0.42) (1.13) 
S&P 600 -0.08 0.34* -0.51*** 1.19*** 2.53*** 
 (0.10) (0.19) (0.16) (0.36) (0.98) 
# of sentences in RF section 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.04*** 0.09*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 2.10*** 4.07*** 1.63*** 3.97*** -1.43 
 (0.27) (0.50) (0.44) (0.95) (2.59) 
      
Observations 9,346 9,346 9,346 9,346 9,346 
Number of cid 1,926 1,926 1,926 1,926 1,926 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table Ⅶ.3. Results of panel regression of employee satisfaction on firms’ attention to different 
stakeholder groups and different firm performance indices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Employee satisfaction Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
#Stock price 0.00     
 (0.00)     
#Profit  -0.00**    
  (0.00)    
#Shareholders   -0.00   
   (0.00)   
#Employees    0.00  
    (0.00)  
#Customers     0.00 
     (0.00) 
ROA 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Market value (logged) 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
#of employees (in millions) -0.35*** -0.35*** -0.35*** -0.35*** -0.35*** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
S&P 400 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
S&P 500 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
S&P 600 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Variance of GD ratings (firm-year) -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
# of GD reviews (firm-year) Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry dummy Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 2.66*** 2.67*** 2.66*** 2.65*** 2.66*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
      
Observations 9,477 9,477 9,477 9,477 9,477 
Number of cid 1,986 1,986 1,986 1,986 1,986 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Firms’ attention to employee recruitment (in risk factors section of 10-K) increases 
employee satisfaction. 
What does it mean that managers list recruitment issues as one of the firms’ risk factors? 
For example, LinkedIn Corporation wrote in their risk factors section “Our future success will 
depend upon our continued ability to identify, hire, develop, motivate and retain world class 
talent.” When managers discuss potential failure of talent recruitment as one of their risk factors, 
it may mean that their businesses are dependent upon human capital, while at the same time they 
foresee difficulties in talent recruitment due to an intense competition for talent and/or a limited 
amount of resources to offer to new hires. In other words, these companies are likely to be 
dependent on human capital while they are relatively resourceless. This speculation is based on 
the results of the analyses that S&P500 firms and firms with large index fund ownership are less 
likely to mention employee recruitment as one of their risk factors. Also, further analysis shows 
that firms with low net income are more likely to mention employee recruitment as one of their 
risk factors. As a result of firms’ high dependency on human capital and their relatively limited 
resources, managers will be motivated to attend to employees’ various needs. As a result, 
managers will create and maintain high performance work systems that can be attractive for their 
current and potential employees. Further analysis shows that the number of recruitment-related 
words in the risk factors section increases employees’ satisfaction with their career opportunity, 
culture, senior management, and work-life balance, but it does not increase employees’ 
satisfaction with compensation/benefits.  
An alternative explanation is that firms with high dependency on human capital may 
encourage their current employees to leave high ratings of their companies on Glassdoor so that 
the companies can look attractive for potential employees. Another alternative explanation is that 
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firms’ disclosure of recruitment-related information on their 10-K form increases employees’ 
commitment and motivation by shaping common understanding between employers and 
employees (Lin, Huang, Du, & Lin, 2012; Meyer, Becker, & Vandenberghe, 2004). More studies 
are needed to test these alternative mechanisms. 
 
Firm performance increases employees’ satisfaction with their firms, but it does not 
increase employees’ satisfaction with their compensation. 
The results show that overall employee satisfaction does not increase firm performance, 
however, high firm performance increases overall employee satisfaction. The result is in line 
with the previous findings by Schneider et al. (2003) that employees’ overall job satisfaction is 
not the cause of high firm performance, but rather the consequence of high firm performance.  
Further analysis shows that high firm performance specifically increases employees’ 
satisfaction with their firms’ culture, senior leadership, and career opportunities, but does not 
increase employees’ satisfaction with their compensation/benefits or work-life balance. Also, 
additional analysis revealed that employees’ satisfaction with compensation/benefits negatively 
predicts ROA. These findings suggest that most employees may not have been rewarded with 
higher compensation and benefits even when their firms earned a higher profit. It may even be 
possible that firms gain financial profit at the expense of their employees’ share of compensation 
and benefits.  
My findings regarding the relationship between employees’ satisfaction with their pay 
and firm performance is somewhat opposite from what Schneider et al. (2003) found. Schneider 
et al. (2003) found that employees’ satisfaction with pay predicts high ROA and vice versa. 
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These conflicting results may have been caused because Schneider et al. (2003) and I use 
different samples from different time periods. Schneider et al. (2003) used survey data from 35 
large, esteemed companies from 1987 to 1995. My sample covers around 2,000 companies of 
various sizes from 2008 to early 2018. More studies on the relationship between firms’ financial 
performance and employees’ (satisfaction with) compensation is needed as it relates to important 
issues regarding fairness and distributive justice.    
     
 
Limitations 
 
Several limitations of this dissertation need to be addressed. First, employee reviews on 
Glassdoor may not represent the sentiment of overall employees. Only a portion of employees who 
are vocal would post their reviews, producing a potentially biased sample. In order to minimize 
the selection bias, Glassdoor implemented multiple mechanisms including their Give to Get policy, 
as I explained in Chapter Ⅲ. Also, in order to focus on trends, I averaged employee ratings for 
each firm-year, only using observations with a minimum of 10 reviews (20 reviews for robustness 
checks). Moreover, I controlled for the number of Glassdoor reviews per firm-year, the number of 
total employees in the firm, and the variance of employee ratings for each firm-year observation. 
Another potential limitation of Glassdoor data is that companies can boost their ratings by 
encouraging their employees to post positive reviews. Although Glassdoor implemented 
algorithms to filter out incentivized or forced reviews, it may not be able to perfectly screen them 
out. My analysis of the Glassdoor data revealed that the average rating has increased during the 
study period. In order to address this problem, I controlled for year in all my analyses. Also, I used 
employee ratings on five individual dimensions of their companies. Fortunately, further analysis 
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reveals that employees’ rating of five dimensions of their companies are much less or even not at 
all inflated during the study period. In fact, the five dimensions of the companies are more harshly 
rated than overall satisfaction throughout the year. 
There are also limitations to using 10-K data to measure firms’ level of attention to 
human capital. Annual reports may not accurately reflect firms’ or managers’ level of attention 
to each stakeholder or each of human capital management practice. Although the risk factors 
section in a 10-K form may not be the perfect data source, the results of multiple analyses 
showed that it could be a reasonable proxy for managerial perception of risks. As it is at each 
firm’s discretion to decide about which risk factors to write and how much to write in the annual 
report, it is reasonable to assume that managers’ actual level of attention to each risk is reflected 
in the risk factors section. Also, the fact that employee satisfaction is negatively and significantly 
correlated with the number of words related to profit and cost-based view of employees in the 
risk factors section suggests that 10-K data could be a useful data source to measure firms’ level 
of attention.  
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CHAPTER Ⅷ 
Conclusion 
 
This dissertation examined labor implications of two recent trends in the American 
capital market – a growing control of activist hedge funds and an increasing ownership by large 
index funds: Blackrock, Vanguard, and State Street. More specifically, this dissertation 
investigated whether and how ownership by activist hedge funds and large index funds affect 
employee satisfaction through their influence on managerial attention to human capital.  
By studying all publicly traded firms in the US from 2008 to 2018, this dissertation found 
that ownership by most activist hedge funds and large index funds does not directly affect 
employee satisfaction. However, ownership by Gamco Investors, one of the most active hedge 
funds in terms of the number of activisms, negatively affected employee satisfaction. In addition, 
while firms with low employee satisfaction were more likely to be targeted by Gamco Investors, 
firms with low market value were more likely to be targeted by other activist hedge funds. These 
findings suggest that activist hedge funds may have different strategies and goals that have 
varying effects on employee satisfaction.  
This dissertation also found that shareholders affect managers’ attention to human capital. 
First of all, in terms of managers’ attention to human capital-related risks, ownership by Gamco 
investors led managers to pay less attention to employee-related risks, and ownership by Big3 
index funds led managers to pay less attention to recruitment-related risks. In addition, regarding 
managers’ attention to each stakeholder-driven risk, ownership by activist hedge funds led 
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managers to pay more attention to shareholder-driven risks. Finally, regarding mangers’ attention 
to firm performance indices, ownership by Big3 index funds led managers to pay less attention to 
firms’ stock market performances.  
Lastly, this dissertation found that employee satisfaction is not the cause of firms’ 
financial performance, but rather the consequence of firms’ financial performance measured as 
ROA. However, it is worth noting that high ROA increases employees’ satisfaction with their 
firms’ culture, senior leadership, and career opportunities, but does not affect employees’ 
satisfaction with their compensation/benefits and work-life balance. Moreover, employees’ 
satisfaction with compensation/benefits negatively predicts ROA.   
This paper makes two major contributions. First, the paper contributes to corporate 
governance and human capital management literature by examining the labor implications of 
recent trends in financial capitalism. With increased ownership and control by activist hedge funds 
and large index funds during the past decade, the shareholders of public companies have a stronger 
influence than they did in the past. While existing empirical studies have focused on understanding 
the implications of different shareholders’ ownership for shareholder value, its effect on other 
stakeholders of the firm, employees, for example, remains an open question. Although activist 
hedge funds and large index funds do not directly affect employees’ satisfaction, this dissertation 
demonstrates that they may influence managerial attention to human capital, shareholders and 
stock price. In sum, this dissertation deepens our theoretical understanding of the social 
implications of corporate ownership.  
Second, the paper makes a practical contribution to the body of knowledge surrounding 
shareholders’ and policy makers’ decision making by shedding light on the usefulness of 
Glassdoor review data and 10-K risk factors data that can be used across organizations. 
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Shareholders desire to integrate human capital risk into their investment decisions; however, the 
only available standardized human capital–related measure for publicly traded firms in the US is 
the number of employees, the only required HR element in the firms’ annual report. Recently, a 
group of institutional investors filed a petition with the SEC calling for a human capital-related 
information disclosure requirement, which suggests that investors lack desired information about 
public firms’ human capital. Shareholders can analyze the risk factors section of a 10-K form to 
understand whether managers are attending to human capital-related risks, and, if so, which ones. 
Policy makers also need more information about companies’ human capital management practices 
and performances. While firms implement various human capital management policies to promote 
diversity, fair compensation, and a safe working environment, we lack standard measures to 
evaluate the practices and outcomes of such efforts. Policy makers can examine employees’ rating 
of individual dimensions of their employers to understand firms’ human capital management 
performances. Moreover, policy makers can analyze the risk factors sections of 10-K forms to 
understand which stakeholder groups and firm performance indices managers find important to 
their firms. The SEC’s recent effort to mandate that public firms disclose their CEO-to-median 
worker’s pay ratio is a meaningful step towards the transparency that our society demands. I expect 
my unobtrusive measures of employee satisfaction and firms’ attention to their human capital to 
be a useful tool for investors and policy makers. Managers, employees, and researchers also stand 
to benefit from this work.  
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